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ABSTRACT
PRICING THE CLOUD: AN AUCTION APPROACH
Yang Lu
Old Dominion University, 2020
Chair: Dr. Li D. Xu

Cloud computing has changed the processing and service modes of information
communication technology and has affected the transformation, upgrading and innovation of the
IT-related industry systems. The rapid development of cloud computing in business practice has
spawned a whole new field of interdisciplinary, providing opportunities and challenges for
business management research.
One of the critical factors impacting cloud computing is how to price cloud services. An
appropriate pricing strategy has important practical means to stakeholders, especially to
providers and customers. This study addressed and discussed research findings on cloud
computing pricing strategies, such as fixed pricing, bidding pricing, and dynamic pricing.
Another key factor for cloud computing is Quality of Service (QoS), such as availability,
reliability, latency, security, throughput, capacity, scalability, elasticity, etc. Cloud providers
seek to improve QoS to attract more potential customers; while, customers intend to find QoS
matching services that do not exceed their budget constraints.
Based on the existing study, a hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism, which consists of
subscription and dynamic auction design, is proposed and illustrated to cloud services. The
results indicate that our hybrid pricing mechanism has potential to better allocate available cloud
resources, aiming at increasing revenues for providers and reducing expenses for customers in
practice.

The proposed hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism has the following advantages. (1)
Solving problems of fixed pricing strategy. The price of a resource cannot be dynamically
modified based on resource usage between supply and demand. Cloud providers will suffer
potential revenue loss due to more potential customers will be involved and price will be
fluctuated. The QoS level and performance of the cloud services obtained is directly related to
the expenses a customer needs to pay. If the same amount of cloud services is used, the higher
the performance or the higher QoS level of cloud services a customer requires, the higher prices
of the related cloud services will be. (2) The QoS-based pricing model can present a clear
reserved price to both providers and customers. Differentiated QoS threshold represents different
prices to cloud services; the price itself reflects the user's preference for QoS. Overall, the hybrid
pricing mechanism can explore both the two pricing strategies’ advantages and to provide
supplier and customer expected benefits. (3) Attractive to customers. Based on budget
constraints, customers could customize cloud services as they expect. Customers have good
opportunity to price/bid the expected cloud services.
As a research on cloud computing, this study is one of leading papers that focus on
estimating values of various types of cloud services by mathematical auction design and
operational allocation. Some study explores the ideas about fixed pricing strategies, such as payper-use, subscription, tiered pricing, and free-of-charge; some study pays more attention on
different dynamic pricing mechanisms, such as financial mathematical models and auction
designs. This thesis is the first writing talking about a hybrid pricing design that is consists of
subscription and dynamic auction design for both existing and newcomers of companies to
develop cloud computing in the markets. More important, a QoS-based reference price is

proposed for both provider and customer, ideally, most of popular QoS indicators are embedded
in the reserved pricing model.
This study is a very good attempt to explore cloud pricing strategy. Most of the studies
discuss various cloud pricing strategies from technological or mathematical perspective, but the
pricing mechanisms are difficult to implement in practice because they ignore marketing
conditions, such as supply and demand, and difficulties of companies, such as usage preference
or budget constraint. In this thesis, a real marketing environment is constructed, both existing
companies and newcomers would obtain some insights and benefits if they have chance to put
the hybrid pricing mechanisms into practice. Firstly, companies can judge the development status
of its cloud computing, such as the initiating, developing, and maturing stages. Secondly,
providers can improve the comprehensive quality of cloud resources based on different QoS
expectations from end-users, such as scalability, elasticity, availability, latency, reliability,
security, throughput, capacity, etc. Thirdly, both providers and customers can obtain an accurate
estimated reference price. The hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism has potential to guide
providers and customers in the cloud industry.
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A

Availability

𝐴

The function of availability and cloud resource

𝐴𝑠𝑘

The asking price from provider j

𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐸𝑉

The reserved price of provider j

𝐵

Customer i’s bidding price

𝐵

Provider j’s bidding price

𝐵𝑖𝑑

The bidding price from customer i

𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑉

The reserved price of customer i

C

The cost of cloud resource

𝑑

∗

The bid density of customer 𝑖 ∗

d

The number of luxury or of high-demand customers

E

Elasticity

𝐸

The function of elasticity and cloud resource

F(X)

The function of reserved price

g

The number of poor or of low-demand customers

G

The set of all the possible strategy of a game

i

Customer i

𝑖

The losing bidders

j

Provider j

𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑

The workload of provider j

M

There exist m sellers, M = {𝑚 , j = 1, 2, …, m}
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N

There exist n customers, N = {𝑛 , j = 1, 2, …, n}

𝑂

The other factor impacting the order and price of customer i

P

The marketing price

𝑃

The fixed price

𝑃

The equilibrium price

𝑃

A winning customer i’s payment

𝑃

The reserved price

𝑃

The trading price

𝑃(

)

The Price when demand is high

𝑃(

)

The Price when demand is low

Q

The requests from all customers

𝑄

The service request from customer i

𝑄

The quantity for certain cloud service that customer wins and uses

R

Reliability

𝑅

The function of reliability and cloud resource

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥

The maximum of resources that provider j can provide

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑

The respond time of 𝑄

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑

The total number of other accepted resource requests between time t and the deadline

S

Security

𝑠

The game strategy of a certain unit

𝑆

The set of game strategies for a certain activity

𝑆

The function of security and cloud resource

𝑡

The initiating point

𝑡

The time when the marketing price equals cost

xii
𝑡

The time when the marketing price equals the fixed price

𝑡

The time when the marketing price equals the equilibrium price

𝑇

The length of time the winning customer i will use the service

V

The true value of cloud resource

𝑉

The true expected value from customer i

𝑉

The true expected value from provider j

X

The QoS metrics

𝑋

Customer Consumption level when demand is high

𝑋

Customer Consumption level when demand is low

𝑋

All levels of cloud resources from a customer i

𝑋

All levels of cloud resources from a provider j

𝑋( ,

)

Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is high

𝑋( ,

)

Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is low

𝑈

Utility

𝛼

The degree of impact of the workload on the asking price

𝛽

The degree of impact of the workload on the bidding price
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This chapter is dedicated to describing the overall idea of the study.

1.1 Cloud Computing and Information Systems
Since its inception, cloud computing has been emphasizing its business model in the real
world. The success of the business of cloud computing is largely achieved by developing a
reasonable and advanced pricing mechanism [1-5]. It is critical to develop a pricing strategy for
cloud service that helps providers grasp competitive advantage and obtain more revenues. At the
same time, the fundamental changes in the way of work and business are brought by cloud
computing, leading to the separation of customer and computing resources [6-11]. When
customers need computing resources, they only need to pay a fee to cloud providers. Hence, a
viable pricing strategy is needed to fulfill the requirements of customers [12-18].
Cloud computing not only has a huge impact on the application of information storage,
interaction and computing technologies, but also promotes a new round of business innovation
and revolution [19-23]. From the end of 2006, IT giants Google and Amazon started promoting
cloud computing industry. Subsequently, companies such as IBM, Microsoft, AT & T and
SalesForce followed and launched their own cloud services [24-26]. Cloud computing is an
Internet-based and infrastructure-shared IT service model. By virtualizing and dynamically
configuring computing resources, platform, software, hardware, and data-related services can be
provided. Customers do not need to purchase equipment in advance or care about specific
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computing processes or maintenances. They only need to submit a request to get the service and
then pay based on the usage [27, 33].
Cloud computing, as an emerging and popular terminology in the ICT industry, is
potential to revolutionize the way that companies process business intelligence. Customers do
not need to purchase equipment in advance or care about specific computing processes or
maintenances [34, 35]. They only need to submit a request to get the service and then pay based
on the usage. It is of great practical significance to develop a pricing strategy for cloud service
that helps providers grasp competitive advantage and obtain more revenues. It has become the
development of the national core strategy of the next generation of information technology [3639]. Currently, leading IT companies are gearing up to make business in cloud services:
Amazon.com, Google, Microsoft, and IBM. These companies develop cloud computing focusing
on different cloud services that consisting of the power of cloud computing and the Internet [4043].
With the continuous developing accomplishment of cloud computing and the increasing
requirement of cloud services, the cloud computing service market has entered a period of rapid
growth. Faced with the competition among the cloud industry, cloud pricing will be transformed
from the unilateral (fixed) pricing strategies focusing on provider’s revenue to the bilateral
(dynamic optimal auction) pricing strategies that benefit to both provider and customer, which
will be more suitable for the development of cloud computing [44, 45]. Meanwhile, companies
will seek potential approaches to accompany with cloud computing for normal operation
activities and information system-related transition; individuals will use more cloud-based
services and resources through the Internet or other possible network systems [46, 47].

3
1.2 Purpose and Contribution
I address the issue of designing a novel hybrid QoS-based auction design, through which
cloud services are distributed between providers and customers, along with different pricing
strategies, i.e., subscription and double auction procedure. The goals are to (1) propose QoSembedded metrics to price and match cloud services between different provider’ services and
customers’ expectations, (2) construct a combination of fixed pricing and bidding pricing
strategies to provision available services between multiple providers and customers, and (3)
flexibly and dynamically set up a hybrid QoS-based pricing strategy to optimize provider
revenues.
This study potentially plays important roles in academia and practice. This is the first
paper combine QoS metrics (technological perspective of cloud computing) and dynamic pricing
mechanisms (subscription and auction design) together. It is potential to offer certain insights
and guidance for researchers who are interested in cloud pricing. Variety of auction can be
designed and explored, especially double and combinatorial auction designs. QoS metrics are
good variables to estimate values of cloud computing, and cloud computing includes other
technological factors impacting the overall performance and price. A hybrid QoS-based pricing
mechanism is built to effectively distribute available cloud resources based on marketing
conditions, such as when supply > demand, pricing strategy is different based on marketing
price. The pricing strategy adopted with should benefit to providers or customers, aiming at
achieving better outcomes. The model presents an appropriate reserved price of cloud resources,
which will be as reference to both providers and customers. Throughout the complete pricing
process, a provider could easily locate its own pricing strategies and the status of its cloud
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computing development; a customer could easily seek available cloud services based on its own
QoS expectations and budget constraints.

1.3 Method and Procedure
Based on pricing theory in marketing (supply and demand) and game theory in
economics, I construct three cloud development stages that represent different relations between
supply and demand. Such as the initiating stage, the developing stage, and the maturing stage.
For each stage, I propose an appropriate pricing strategy. For instance, in the initiating stage,
subscription (fixed pricing strategy) is proposed, which is better than a pay-per-use pricing
strategy; for both the developing and maturing stages, dynamic auction design is adopted with,
which can help providers attract more potential customers and obtain more revenues and assist
customers figure out cloud prices and save expenses. According to mathematical proof, the
proposed hybrid pricing mechanism has certain advantages and can fulfill different expectations
for customers and providers. The details are illustrated in Chapter 3, 4 and 5.

1.3.1 Marketing conditions.
The initiating stage is between 𝑡 ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the cost
of cloud resource (C). In the market, there are only a few customers with plenty of cloud
resources from multiple providers. This stage is not a good time for companies to gain revenues,
but to attract potential customers. Also, it is not necessary to change the price instantly. A better
pricing strategy for company to adopt with is to offer customers discount or promotional price.
An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers free-of-charge for certain cloud services for
one year.
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The developing stage is between 𝑡 ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the
fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the cost of cloud resource (C). In the market,
the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the cloud marketing is growing. This stage is
the first time for companies to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the fixed pricing
strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1. Hence, it is better
for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy for company to
adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based on marketing
fluctuation between supply and demand. Although for a certain customer’s resources, a provider
offers a lower price, a lower price based on supply and demand will attract more customers to
purchase cloud resources, leading to the economies of scale. Companies will obtain more
revenues overall eventually. An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers Spot Instance
for certain cloud services.
The maturing stage is between 𝑡 ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the
equilibrium price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ). In
the market, the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the cloud marketing is growing.
This stage is the second time for companies to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the
fixed pricing strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1.
Hence, it is better for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy
for company to adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based
on marketing fluctuation between supply and demand. An example is Amazon AWS who offers
customers Spot Instance for certain cloud services.
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1.3.2 The Function of QoS-based reserved price.
The QoS metrics (X) is consisting of availability (𝐴( ) ), reliability (𝑅 ), elasticity (𝐸 ), etc.
The bidding price is based on the reserved price ( 𝑃 ) that is applicable to both seller and buyer. x
refers to all possible features that influence the performance of QoS in cloud computing, such as
CPU power, speed, storage, location, etc.
The QoS metrics (X):
𝑋
A (Availability), 𝐴
E (Elasticity), 𝐸
R (Reliability), 𝑅
S (Security), 𝑆
…
The function that expresses the reserved price is:
𝑃 = 𝐹(𝑋) = 𝐹(𝐴𝑥 , 𝐸𝑥 , 𝑅𝑥 , 𝑆𝑥 , … )

1.3.3 The Hybrid pricing mechanisms
The hybrid QoS-based piecing mechanism consists of subscription and dynamic auction
design for different marketing conditions between supply and demand. For instance, in the
initiating stage, a subscription pricing strategy will be used, aiming at attracting potential
customers and expanding marketing share; in the developing and maturing stages, a dynamic
double auction pricing strategy will be employed to benefit to both providers and customers.
Specifically, when the cost of cloud resource is higher than the marketing price in cloud market
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(the initiating stage), a fixed subscription price strategy will be adopted; when the marketing
price is higher than the cost of cloud resource but lower than the fixed price of cloud resource
(the developing stage), a dynamic auction design will be implemented; when the marketing price
is higher than the fixed price of cloud resource but lower than the equilibrium price of cloud
resource (when supply equals to demand, the maturing stage), a dynamic auction design will be
implemented. The following table (Table 1-1) depicts the details.
TABLE 1-1
Pricing Strategies of Three Development Stages
Developing Stage

Pricing Strategy

Initiating

Subscription
(Fixed Pricing Strategy)

Developing

Dynamic Auction Design
(Dynamic Pricing Strategy)

Maturing

Dynamic Auction Design
(Dynamic Pricing Strategy)

1.4 Outline of The Thesis
The construct of this research is outlined below. Chapter 1 is the introduction. A brief
explanation of cloud computing and information systems is addressed, as well as the purpose and
contribution of the thesis. Moreover, methods used in the thesis and detailed procedures are
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introduced and explained. Chapter 2 provides a common understanding of cloud computing and
game theory (auction design), discusses various cloud computing pricing strategies, and points
out the unresolved issues related to the extant pricing mechanisms, specifically Quality of
Service (QoS), such as availability, reliability, latency, security, throughput, capacity, scalability,
elasticity, etc. Chapter 3 introduces three developing stages (the initiating stage, the developing
stage, and the maturing stage) in details, illustrates QoS indicators that impact cloud evaluations,
and proposes the QoS-based reserved model to cloud resources. Chapter 4 illustrate the proposed
hybrid QoS-based pricing strategies, such as subscription and dynamic auction design, the
bidding procedure is depicted as well. The comprehensive detailed models and mathematical
explanations are included in this chapter. Chapter 5 points out several limitations and potentials
for future direction. For instance, the issues of current cloud pricing mechanisms, the marketing
condition of supply and demand, the decentralized cloud trading platform, and the impact of
QoS-based pricing strategy on customer purchasing behavior as an empirical study. Chapter 6
concludes the study and present some insights of cloud pricing and developing in future.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This chapter is dedicated to discussing the background of the study.

2.1 Introduction to Cloud
2.1.1 The Concept of Cloud Computing and The Basic Elements
“Cloud computing: A model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability and is
composed of five core technical characteristics, three service models, and four deployment
models”1 [48-50].
Cloud computing is not a new type of computing technology, also a new type of network
application programming. The core concept of cloud computing is Internet-centric, providing
fast and secure cloud computing services and data storage on websites so that everyone can use
the Internet. Huge computing resources and data centers can be used by anyone. After the
Internet and computers, cloud computing is an innovation in the information age. The following
depict (Fig. 2-1) is a comprehensive view of cloud computing.

1

This is one of the popular definitions from NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology).
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Core Technical
Characteristics

Service
Model

Deployment
Model

Potential
Business Value

Potential
Risks

Self-Service Virtualization

Dynamic
Elasticity Compatibility
Configuration

SaaS
PaaS
IaaS
Software as a Service Platform as a Service Infrastructure as a Service

Public

Private

Hybrid

Community

(1) Advantage of Cost and Effectiveness (2) No Geographical or
Equipment Restriction (3) Advantage of Flexibility (4) Supporting
Business Development and Innovation (5) Emancipating Core Resources
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Fig. 2-1. A Comprehensive View of Cloud Computing

2.1.2 The Features of Cloud Computing
In short, the core technical characteristics of cloud computing are mainly reflected in the
following five aspects [51-55]: (1) On-demand Self-service. If users need cloud services, they
can run on the cloud platform themselves without having to communicate with the cloud
provider every time. (2) Virtualization. Cloud computing storage and computing resources have
been virtualized to users and cannot be accessed directly. As we all know, the physical platform
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and environment in which applications are deployed have no spatial connection. It is a virtual
platform that can complete data backup, migration and expansion of corresponding terminal
operations. (3) Dynamic configuration. Cloud computing can dynamically assign computing
tasks to different resources in the cloud, and can also provide resources to different customers
simultaneously. Cloud computing achieves the purpose of dynamically configuring the level of
virtualization and expanding applications.; (4) Resource elasticity. Cloud computing can flexibly
allocate and release resources to meet the different needs of different users for computing
resources. (5) Technical compatibility. Users can enjoy cloud computing services through any
form of network access device [3]. It can be seen that the compatibility of cloud computing is
very strong. Not only is it compatible with low-profile machines and hardware products from
different manufacturers, but it can also perform higher-performance calculations on peripherals.

2.1.3 The Three Service Models of Cloud Computing
Generally, cloud computing includes three major categories: infrastructure as a service
(IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS). Among the three service
models, SaaS is the most popular service that most companies are conducting and provisioning
in practice. A detailed description is in the following figure (Fig. 2-2). NIST clearly defined all
the three service models. This study also adopts the same thinking to analyze some possible
pricing mechanisms for cloud services. The extant study always clarifies which service model (s)
the study targeted at, but this study won’t really distinguish the three service models. Similarity
and difference among these three service models are not the focus in this thesis. Hence, the
proposed hybrid QoS-based dynamic pricing mechanisms are applicable to all the three service
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models, although in practice for a certain service model, the mechanism might need some
adjustment.

IaaS

Amazon AWS, Google App Engine, Google Compute Engine, IBM
Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Cisco Metapod, DigitalOcean, Linode

Amazon AWS Elastic Beanstalk, Google App Engine, Microsoft
PaaS

SaaS

Azure, Salesforce Heroku, Engine Yard, OpenShift, Apache Stratos

Amazon AWS, Google App Engine, Google Compute Engine,
BigCommerce, Salesforce, Dropbox, MailChimp, ZenDesk,
DocuSign, Slack, Hubspot, …

Fig. 2-2. Service Models and Providers
IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) provides customers with the computing resources,
including servers, networks, storage, and data centers. “The capability provided to the consumer
is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are
accessible from various client devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web
browser (e.g., web-based email), or a program interface. The consumer does not manage or
control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems,
storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user
specific application configuration settings”2 [48], [56, 57].
PaaS (Platform as a Service) provides consumers with a cloud-based environment to
develop applications. Customers do not need to buy and manage the underlying cloud

2

NIST definition.
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infrastructure. Such as hardware, software, and operating systems. “The capability provided to
the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired
applications created using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by the
provider. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including
network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications
and possibly configuration settings for the application-hosting environment 3” [48], [58, 59].
SaaS (Software as a Service) provides customers with cloud-based applications, which
customers can access through the Internet. “The capability provided to the consumer is to
provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the
consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and
applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but
has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and possibly limited
control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls) 4” [48], [60-62].
Currently, many companies are pursuing cloud computing on IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS,
especially SaaS is the most popular resources. The following table (Table 2-1) lists major
companies and services. In the real business world, as a cloud-related company or provider, it is
better to implement all possible services not focusing on only one specific service models, e.g.,
SaaS. More and more companies try to collaborate resources or partner with other companies to
develop more service models to attract more customers and gain more revenues as possible [6264]. Some other type of cloud service is defined, such as Databased as a Service, Analytics as a
Service, Blockchain as a Service, etc. This thesis still follows the same definitions from NIST
that depicts the three major service models as the majority; other newly developed service model

3
4

NIST definition.
NIST definition.
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also accompanies with the same features of the three major service models. Even to most of the
existing companies, they have some limitations to develop service models other than the three
major models, e.g., limited investment and resources, the marketing focus and sales strategies,
technological preference and information advantages [65-67].
TABLE 2-1
Resources of Service Models
Service Model

Products

Customer Activity

Amazon: AWS EC2
(Elastic Compute Cloud),
IaaS

Processing IT-related
AWS S3 (Simple Storage

(Infrastructure as a Service)

infrastructure operations
Services),
AWS Glacier;
Amazon AWS Lamda,
Heroku Platform,
Developing and

PaaS

IBM Cloud Kubernetes,
deploying resources in a

(Platform as a Service)

Salesforce Lightning
cloud platform
Platform,
Wordday Cloud Platform
Google Apps,
DropBox,

Adopting with cloud

HubSpot,

services for business

Zoom Conference

operations

SaaS
(Software as a Service)
Meeting,
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CanGurus Car Sales
Services

2.1.4 The Four Deployment Models of Cloud Computing
There are four deployment models (Table 2-3) for cloud computing, which basically
include all cloud services and platforms [68-71]. The four models are: (1) Public cloud. Public
cloud refers to cloud services provided to all individuals and businesses. Users can share
infrastructure, development platforms and application terminals; (2) Private cloud. Private cloud
is a cloud service for a specific business or organization provided by the enterprise itself or a
third-party vendor; (3) Community Cloud. A group cloud is a cloud service for a specific group.
Related groups often have the same needs, tasks, or interests, and related services can be
provided by companies in the group or a combination of multiple companies. It can be provided
by third parties; (4) Hybrid cloud. Hybrid cloud refers to a cloud service model that integrates
the above two or three models. This usually happens when a single service model cannot meet
user needs [72-74].
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Public Cloud
All individual and
businesses

Community Cloud

Hybrid Cloud

For group usage

Integrates at least two
deployment models

Private Cloud
Specific business or
organization

Fig. 2-3. Deployment Models of Cloud Computing

2.1.5 The Potential Business Values of Cloud Computing
The potential business values of cloud computing are summarized from the following
five aspects:
(1) Advantages of cost and effectiveness. The dynamic configuration and resource
elasticity of cloud computing has the advantages of economies of scale, thereby decreasing the
expenses and increasing the effectiveness of use for users [75-77].
(2) No geographical or equipment restrictions. The virtualization and technology
compatibility features of cloud computing can ensure that users can access cloud resources in
different situations and locations; in addition, work data will not be lost even if a computer or
mobile phone is lost [78-80].
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(3) Advantage of flexibility. Cloud computing's self-service and resource resilience can
bring application flexibility to individual and business users. Cloud computing's low asset
specificity and low conversion costs also enable users to learn, master, and use the latest
technologies and business management processes on cloud platforms [81-84].
(4) Supporting business development and innovation. With the support of virtualization
and self-service, cloud computing can continuously provide enterprises with various services.
Therefore, when business needs change quantitatively or qualitatively, companies can use cloud
computing to quickly expand their business while maintaining the standardization and quality
stability of the products or services. In addition, the various service functions of cloud computing
can lay the technical foundation and provide an experimental environment for enterprises to
conduct business and service innovation. Businesses can continue to experiment and learn to
maintain strong innovation momentum and capabilities [85-88].
(5) Emancipating the core resources of the enterprise. Because cloud computing can
easily meet the basic IT needs of business users, companies using cloud computing can invest
more human, material and financial resources to develop core and value-added businesses [8994].

2.1.6 The Risks of Cloud Computing
(1) Service quality issues. Because cloud resources are automatically implemented, users
cannot control the quality of service of cloud computing. It is difficult to take interventions even
if they encounter quality of service issues [95-97].
(2) Hacker attack. Hacking refers to the use of some illegal means to enter the cloud
computing security system, causing some damage to the cloud computing security network.
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After the invasion, the operation is unexpected, and the losses caused are also a lot. The damage
caused is unpredictable [98-100].
(3) Information confidentiality. Information confidentiality is the main problem of cloud
computing technology and the main problem of current cloud computing technology. For
example, some businesses share user resources. The particularity of the network environment
allows people to freely browse related salary resources. Information resource leakage is
inevitable. If the technology is not confidential enough, it may seriously affect the owner of the
information resource [101-103].
(4) Data integrity. When using cloud computing technology, data may not be stored in
the same location, rather than in a single system, which affects the integrity of data resources and
makes it difficult to operate effectively. Another situation is that the service provider cannot
correctly and effectively manage the user's data information, which will affect the integrity of the
data storage, and the application of the information is difficult to play [104, 105].
(5) Standardization issues. Failure to standardize data and processes across different
cloud computing providers may lead to issues, such as compatibility, technology application
flexibility, and strategic planning [106-108].
(6) Incomplete laws and regulations. Incomplete laws and regulations related to cloud
computing technology are also a major problem. It is necessary to improve its relevant laws and
regulations. At present, laws and regulations are not complete, and the role of cloud computing
technology is still limited. From the current application of cloud computing technology in
computer networks, it lacks perfect security standards, lacks perfect service level agreement
management standards, and has no clear legal responsibility for security issues. In addition, the
lack of a complete cloud computing security management loss computer system and liability
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assessment mechanism, and the lack of legal norms also restrict the development of various
activities, and the cloud computing security of computer networks is difficult to guarantee [109111].

2.2 Game Theory and Auction Design
2.2.1 Concept of Game Theory
Game theory refers to a mathematical model abstracted from the political, economic and
military activities of human society. In this kind of activity, there are participating units or
people, called participants or people in the game [112-114]. Participants reflect their
participation in this activity by choosing certain actions. Participants' activities involve certain
interests of themselves and other participants. This interest is not only related to their own
behavior, but also to the behavior of other participants. Game theory mainly studies the rational
behavior of participants in such activities, and studies the final result of the game under the
premise that all participants adopt rational behavior [115-117].
Game theory is a discipline specializing in the study of conflicts and cooperation among
rational individuals. Game theory was founded in 1944 by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern.
The famous book "Game Theory and Economic Behavior" was published in 1944. But its rapid
development was in the 1950s. After John Forbes Nash Jr. published two basic non-cooperative
game theory papers5. Cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game theory are two
components of game theory, but in recent years, game theory has not only developed rapidly, but
also has been more and more widely used in economics and other fields [118-120].

5

Nash, John (1950) "Equilibrium points in n-person games" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
36(1):48-49, and Nash, John (1951) "Non-Cooperative Games" The Annals of Mathematics 54(2):286-295.
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2.2.2 Elements of Game Theory
In game theory, strategic game models usually consist of three elements [112-117].
(1) Participant Set: To construct a game theory model, you need to know who participate
in this activity. Participants do not necessarily refer only to individuals, but also refer to person,
also include government, enterprise, region, country, etc. The set of all participants becomes the
set of participants, denoted as N = {1, 2, 3, …, i, …, n}. i ∈ 𝑁 is participants.
(2) Strategy: In a game model, 𝑠 denotes the participant i’s strategy, such as 𝑆 , i ∈ 𝑁.
Every participant needs to choose a strategy, constructing a strategy vector s =
(𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 ) as a strategic set, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 .
𝑆 = {s = (𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 )│𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 }
(3) Payoff Model: It is defined as on the strategy combination set 𝑆 , which takes a value
in the real space R and is expressed as 𝑢 (𝑠). It is used to describe certain gains or losses
suffered by participant i under the strategy combination 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 . The utility function 𝑢 (𝑠) in
game theory is controlled not only by participant i, but also by i's opponent. In other words, the
interests of the participants are mutually restrictive.
The strategy game model can be expressed as：
G = <N, 𝑆 , 𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , >

2.2.3 Classification of Game Theory
Game theory are classified as cooperative and non-cooperative models (whether or not
cooperation is strongly restricted) according to the behavior of cooperative participants. Starting
with participants choosing actions simultaneously or at different times, non-cooperative games
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are categorized into static and dynamic models. According to the participants' understanding
information of the game itself, non-cooperative games are classified into models with complete
information and incomplete information. Hence, non-cooperative model consists of four basic
types: static model with complete information, dynamic model with complete information, static
model with incomplete information, and dynamic model with incomplete information[113-115],
[117,118].

2.2.4 Nash Equilibrium
In the game model, how each participant chooses strategies rationally, and on the premise
that each participant is rational, the outcome of the game are the two focuses of debate. In game
theory, it is assumed that each participant is rational, they can correctly predict the opponent's
behavior, and under this premise, their own reward will be maximized. Under the assumption of
participants rational behavior, the participants' reasonable strategy portfolio can be described by
the following Nash equilibrium [121, 122].
Definition 1. G = <N, 𝑆 , 𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , >is a generalized game model, strategic
portfolio 𝑠 ∗ = (𝑠 ∗ , 𝑠 ∗ ), 𝑠 ∗ ∈ 𝑆 is a Nash Equilibrium. If ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and 𝑠

= 𝑠 ∗ , the participant

i’s optimal strategy is:
𝑢 (𝑠 ∗ , 𝑠 ∗ ) = max 𝑢 (𝑠 ∗ , 𝑠 ∗ )
∈

Game theory believes that rational participants should choose strategies in Nash
equilibrium 𝑠 ∗ . If the participant i can expect that the opponent will not choose 𝑠 ∗ , he or she will
choose 𝑠 ∗ , then the opponent's reward may decline. If he or she does not choose 𝑠 ∗ , the opponent
chooses 𝑠 ∗ , which may reduce your payment. Therefore, each participant i does not deviate from
the enthusiasm of Nash equilibrium strategy 𝑠 ∗ [123-125].
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2.2.5 Cases of Nash Equilibrium
Case I. The Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The police suspected that persons A and B had committed the crime of partnership, but
there was no conclusive evidence. Thus, the court relied mainly on the confession of the offender
in the judgment. The specific possibilities are as follows:
(1) If neither of them admits the crime they committed, they can only be sentenced to one
year in prison for the misdemeanor found.
(2) If one of them pleads guilty, they will be acquitted for their good guilty attitude.
Another person was sentenced to eight years in prison for fighting crime.
(3) If both plead guilty, they will each be sentenced to 5 years in prison.
The table (Table 2-2) below shows the payoffs.
TABLE 2-2
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner A or B

Confess

Defense

Confess

5, 5

0, 8

Defense

8, 0

1,1

From a mathematical point of view, the theory is reasonable, that is, the choice is
confession. However, this is obviously inappropriate in the sociological field of
multidimensional information collaboration. In ancient China, bribery between officials was
called "wrong rules" rather than trying to find them. This is because the deterrent effect of social
systems on people's behavior forces people's decision-making to change. For example, from a
psychological perspective, the cost of choosing a confession will be greater. One side pleaded
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defense, the other side pleaded defense. Then, the subsequent acts of revenge, and therefore the
"betrayal" role that is not easy to become an insider will fail him.
The increase in proportion between 8 and 10 years will be diluted, human dignity will
cause revenge and slightly undermine the "rules." In order to deal with things that are closer to
the facts, we must have as much relevant information as possible and reasonably weight the
analysis. The dynamics of human motion is very complex, so the plight of prisoners can only be
used as a reference for simplified models and specific decisions.
According to strategic portfolio s = (𝑠 , 𝑠 ), 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , i = 1, 2. The two persons have the
identical strategic portfolios, 𝑆 = 𝑆 = {𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒}. The payoffs of the two prisoners
are:

𝑢 𝑠 ,𝑠

−5
0
=
−8
−1

𝑠 =𝑠
𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑠
𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒, 𝑠
𝑠 =𝑠

= 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
= 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
= 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
= 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒

𝑢 𝑠 ,𝑠

−5
0
=
−8
−1

𝑠 =𝑠
𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒, 𝑠
𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑠
𝑠 =𝑠

= 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
= 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
= 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
= 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒

Case II. The Beauty’s Coin
A beauty comes to chat with a gentleman and asks to play games with him. The beauty
advice: "Let's show the coin's two sides, positive or negative. If we are all positive, I give you 3
dollars, if we are all negative, I give you 1 dollar, and you give me 2 dollars. The gentleman will
participate in the game anyway. The potential results are indicated in the following table (Table
2-3).
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TABLE 2-3
A Beauty’s Choice
Gentleman or The Beauty

Front

Back

Front

3, -3

-2, 2

Back

-2, 2

1, -1

Suppose the probability of front side is x and the probability of back side is (1-x). In order
to maximize the gentleman’s income, when the beauty’s coin is front or back, the income should
be equal, otherwise the beauty can change the probability of the front and back sides at any time
and reduce the total income.
It is the same as the maximum return when the beauty moves on. Solve the problem,
which means that there are 3 front sides every 8 times, and 5 back sides are our best strategy.
Substitute x = 3/8 into the income expression 3 * x + (-2) * (1-x) to get each expected income.
The calculation result is -1/8 dollar.
Similarly, we assume that the beauty has a front probability of (y), a back probability of
(1-y).
Whenever the expected outcome of the beauty is 2 (1-y) -3y = 1/8 dollar, the solution y is
also equal to 3/8. This tells us that with the best strategy adopted by both parties, an average of
1/8 won can be paid for each beauty’s winning. In fact, if the beauty adopts the decision of (3/8,
5/8), no matter which plan the gentleman will use, this situation cannot be changed. If both
parties are both front sides of the coin, the expected return is (3 + 3 + 3-2-2-2-2-2) / 8 = -1 / 8
dollar.
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If both are back sides, the expected return is (-2-2-2 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1) / 8 = -1 / 8
dollar. And any strategy is nothing more than a linear combination of the above two strategies, so
it can still be expected to be -1/8 dollar. However, when the gentleman also uses the best
strategy, he can at least guarantee the least loss. Otherwise, he will be targeted by the strategy
adopted by the beauty, and he will lose more. This game model doesn't seem very useful, but in
fact, it may involve one of the most important models in financial market pricing: the pricing
weighted model.
Generally speaking, the foundation of game theory is to explore the competitive
phenomenon in the form of a game, and to employ mathematical and logical approaches to
analyze the rules of activities. Because there are game participants, there must be a game ruler. A
deep understanding of the nature of competitive behavior will help us analyze and grasp the
relationship between things in competition, and make it easier for us to formulate and adjust
rules, so that the rules can ultimately operate according to our intended goals [124-126].

2.2.5 Different types of auction processes
If a product or service does not have a reference to estimate its true value, an auction
design is a suitable way to track prices and distribution. Because of uncertainty, we do not have a
standardized mechanism for adoption; indeed, an auction design can take advantage of any
uncertainty to overcome obstacles. Game-based auctions can estimate resources to a certain
degree, relying mainly on participants’ bids rather than on the fluctuations of supply and demand
[115-118], [124, 125]. The below picture addresses various auction designs (Fig. 2-4).
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Fig. 2-4. Taxonomy of Auction Design
An English auction is during the auction, the auctioneer announced an increase in the
minimum starting price and auction target. Bidders start from the initial bid, from the lowest
price to the highest price. However, the transaction price should be greater than the reserved
price. This auction method got its name because it originated in England. England is a
gentleman-civilized country. When the auction boomed, it became rich. Many rich people are
willing to confirm their identity and strength in the auction. Such as antiques, artworks, ancient
books, etc. The identity of the participants has a great influence on their "face psychology", the
auction site is very fierce, the price increase is very large, and the characteristics of competitive
price increases are obvious [112-115].
Dutch auctions are also called "low-price auctions" or "high-value auctions." This means
that during the procedure, the auctioneer will announce the starting price and the price reduction
of the auction target, and then the first bidder will end the transaction. As the same as English
auction, the transaction price should be greater than the reserved price as well. The auction price
of the auction target decreases a bidder’s bid wins (equal to or higher than the reserved price).
Reduced-price auctions usually start at very high prices, prices are too high, and sometimes no
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one even bids. Currently, the price drops from a high price to a low price until the bidder is
willing to accept it. If there are two or more bidders responding to the price at the same time, it
will be converted into a price increase auction. In most reduced-price auctions, there are many
bids. Because auctions often use reduced-price auctions when the quality is different, the first
bidder with the highest bid can purchase all items, but usually only the best item can be
purchased at the highest price. Then, the auction continued, and prices fell. When another bidder
is willing to accept the bid, he also has the same choice, which is the best choice for the
remaining choices, and then the auction will continue. In this case, although bidders remained
silent most of the time, there was still constant competition among bidders [117-120].
A combination of British and Dutch auctions. This means that during the auction, after
the auctioneer initiates the auctioning (i.e., the bidding price and the lowest price), the bidder
will bid for the corresponding price, the auctioneer will increase the bidding price in turn, and the
highest bidder will win. If no one bids, the auctioneer will lower the bid and the price, bid
sequentially, and bid with the first bidder. Also, the transaction price should be greater than the
reserved price [123-126].
Sealed-bid auctions are also called tender auctions. The buyer submits the sealed offer
(also known as the bid) to the auctioneer within a specified time, and the auctioneer selects the
buyer. Compared with the above two methods, the auction method has the following two
characteristics: first, in addition to price conditions, other transaction conditions need to be
considered; second, it can be open-bided. This method can be used when auctioning large
facilities or large inventory items or items confiscated by the government [121-123].
Vickrey auctions, also known as second price sealed auctions. This auction method is
basically the same as the first auction, except that the winner must pay the second highest price,
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not his own price. This is similar to the agency bidding system used by eBay. In this system, the
winner needs to pay the second highest bid, plus a price increase (e.g., 10%). In practical
applications, the Vickrey auction was accepted. For instance, the method of auctioning Treasury
Bills in the United States has been adopted with. However, their rules allow the number of
objects to be greater than one, and the number of bidders can exceed one. The rules are as
follows: when bidders bid, they need to determine the required quantity and unit price. The seller
ranks all bids based on the total bid amount (from high to low), gives priority to the highest
bidder, and then determines the price as an allocation that does not meet the target ’s highest bid.
Because the bidder does not think that all bids have the same price, it is called the unit price
method. The price is determined by the highest bid price without bidders, so it still retains the
characteristics of the Vickrey auction, that is, everyone will bid based on their own real
evaluation [116-120].
Combinatorial auction is a type of auction. It was proposed in 1982. It is different from
traditional auctions. This is an auction method where bidders can bid on combinations of
multiple commodities. It applies to the situation where the buyer does non-cumulative
measurement of the value of the goods. Compared with traditional auctions, combinatorial
auctions are more efficient when distributing multiple commodities. The target of this auction
method is to gain various commodities. The buyer writes a combination of multiple commodities
and the price of the combination, or the seller provides a different combination, and the buyer
bids for the combination provided by the seller. This auction method increases the value of the
combined items more effectively than a single auction [117, 118].
Reverse auctions, also known as auction purchases, are commonly used in government
procurement and engineering procurement. The buyer provides information on the desired

29
product, service needs and affordable price positioning, while the seller determines the final
product provider and service provider in a competitive manner so that the buyer can get the best
price / performance ratio. Reverse auction as a common auction method has the following
characteristics: (1) Because the transaction rules of reverse auction are to win at a lower price, it
can save costs for buyers; (2) It is said that the buyer ’s purchase purpose is strong, and the
transaction process is relatively simple and easy to control. (3) Since the reverse auction is
conducted in accordance with certain rules, for the seller, fair competition among the sellers is
guaranteed; (4) In the reverse auction process, the price determines who the buyer chooses to buy
the goods from. Therefore, price is a key factor, and the seller ’s product quality, reputation, etc.
cannot be used as judgment criteria; (5) Since the seller is rational, the bid price cannot be lower
than its cost value [120-122].
For instance, an English auction is a single-sided auction, whereas a combinatorial double
auction is a double-sided auction. In a combinatorial double auction, sellers and buyers submit
estimates for bundled objects. Providers have flexible chances to sell items to different
customers; customers have more dynamic opportunities to purchase bundled items from different
providers, just as they would expect. Depending on unique features of cloud computing,
companies have the chance to employ different types of auction [127-129]. The following figure
(Fig. 2-5) describes bidding directions of different types of auctions.
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Fig. 2-5. Different Bidding Directions of Auctions

2.2.6 Conditions of auction design
In economics, an auction design could be perfect, such auction is able to achieve to three
major criteria: Individual Rationality (IR), Budget Balance (BB), and Truthfulness (TF). However,
in reality, it is so difficult to conduct all the three rules together because of there exist many
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different factors impact the ideal model to be true [130-132]. In this auction design, I focus on two
requirements: Individual Rationality (IR) and Truthfulness (TF).
Individual Rationality (IR): All participants (provider and customer) are rational. In other
words, each participant would seek some benefit through the procedure, otherwise, no participant
wants to join the auction. For instance, customer i’s bid should be greater than the marketing price
(P), at least the two prices are equal: 𝐵 ≥ P. on the other side, the bidding price (P) should be
greater than provider’s estimation (𝐵 ), to the most provider’s bid equals to the marketing price:
P ≥ 𝐵 . In practice, IR is a natural phenomenon that applicable to each unit in game theory [133138]. Each participant has the incentive to act in an auction design, because of the potential
nonnegative gains through bidding auction procedure.
𝐵 ≥𝑃≥𝐵

(2-1)

𝐵 ≥𝐵

(2-2)

Assumption 1:

Budget Constraints (BC): No customer would like to pay more than his affordability. In
particular, the customer i’s overall payment is below his budget constraints exactly. This threshold
ensures that customer will obtain expected qualified cloud services with reasonable prices.
Furthermore, different levels of customer budget constraints various requirements of QoS
expectations. In other words, for customer, his objective is to seek the same level of qualified cloud
services with a relative lower expense [139-143].
Truthfulness (TF): Truthfulness is also known as incentive compatibility (IC) or strategyproof [144-146]. Based on Nash Equilibrium, each participant should report a truthful value (V) if
he or she intend to optimize profits and utility. Otherwise, if some of the participants choose
untruthfully bidding (𝐵 ≠ 𝑉 𝑜𝑟 𝐵 ≠ 𝑉 ), they will suffer potential losses. Truthfulness is critical
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in maintain a well-being environment in the cloud computing business: a trusted, fairness, and
efficient market [147-149].
(2-3)

𝐵 = 𝑉 and 𝐵 = 𝑉

2.3 Cloud Pricing Mechanisms
At present, fixed pricing strategies are widely used because of the simplicity and easy
understanding. The adoption of dynamic pricing mechanism is still relatively small, mainly
because its pricing mechanism is more complicated, but dynamic pricing mechanism can
compensate the disadvantages of fixed pricing mechanism. For instance, dynamic pricing can
present flexible prices based upon the marketing fluctuation (between supply and demand) and
avoid potential loss caused by fixed pricing; meanwhile, dynamic pricing can reduce the trading
price to balance customer’s budget constraint. As the cloud industry continues to develop, the
dynamic pricing mechanism will attract more and more participants’ attention and meet with
various requirements. The following table list some of popular cloud services from different
companies using different types of pricing strategies (Table 2-4).
TABLE 2-4
Pricing Strategies of Cloud Services from Different Companies
Pricing
Company

Services

Functions
Strategy
Free-of-

Analytics/application

charge

integration/blockchain/

Pay-per-use

compute/customer

Subscription

engagement/Database/game

EC2 (Elastic Compute
Amazon
Cloud)/S3 (Simple Storage
AWS
Service) /Aurora/
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DynamoDB/RDS/Lambda/VP

Spot Instance tech/IoT/machine

C/

learning/media services/

Lightsail/SageMaker

networking/security/storage

Free-ofGoogle

charge
Application platform

App

Pay-per-use

Engine

Facilities/web application

Tiered
pricing
Free-of-

Analytics/application

Bare metal services/virtual
charge

integration/blockchain/

servers/ object
IBM
Cloud

Pay-per-use

compute/customer

Subscription

engagement/Database/game

storage/Kubernetes service/
Cloudant/blockchain platform/
tech/IoT/machine
Waterson Assistant/Natural
learning/media services/
language understanding
networking/security/storage
Pay-per-use

Analytics/application

Subscription

integration/blockchain/

Virtual machines/windows
virtual desktop/SQL
compute/customer
Microsoft

database/App service /Cosmoc
engagement/Database/game

Azure

DB/PlayFab/Kubernetes
tech/IoT/machine
service/Functions/Cognitive
learning/media services/
services/Quantum
networking/security/storage
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Other
Akamai/Alibaba Cloud/Box.net/Linode/OpSource/Rackspace /SalesForce.com…
Companies

2.3.1 Fixed pricing strategy
There are many different types of fixed pricing: pay-per-use, subscription, unit pricing,
and tiered pricing. Pay-per-use and subscription are the two main fixed pricing strategies adopted
by companies (Table 2-5).
Today, cloud computing services mostly follow a very simple pricing scheme, offering
fixed prices for various resource types. The fixed pricing strategy for different cloud services is
mainly in one of three forms: pay per use, subscription, and tiered pricing [150]. Pay-per-use,
which means that the customer pays a fixed price for the unit service used, typically gigabytes
per hour or CPU per hour. Pay per use is typically used in the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
and Platform as a Service (PaaS) models. For instance, Amazon AWS and Google App Engine
charge a fee of the service based on usage. Subscription refers to a pre-selected combination of
service units that are used for a long time at a fixed price [151]. Customers subscribe (or sign
contracts) and believe that in the subscription model, pricing is based on time rather than usage.
In addition to pay per use, subscription is the most commonly used model for cloud service.
Subscription is the most widely used pricing model for Software as a Service (SaaS). It allows
customers to predict the periodic cost of their use of cloud services, and customers can use the
service by paying an annual or monthly fee [152]. In cloud computing, tiered pricing mainly
refers to providers offer multiple levels of services. Each level has certain technological
specifications (e.g., storage, geographical location, memory, CPU power, elasticity, security,
etc.) and service level agreements (SLAs). Customers can choose certain level of service to buy
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according to their needs. Amazon AWS also adopts tiered pricing strategy. Amazon.com sells a
variety of different types of specifications. Each is packaged into a different storage and memory
format. Customers can purchase different specifications as needed [49], [153].
TABLE 2-5
Comparison of The Four Major Fixed Pricing Strategies
Type of
Pricing
Features

Cloud

Companies

Strategy
Resources
Consumers pay for the

IaaS, PaaS,
Amazon AWS, Google App

resources they use based on

SaaS

Pay-per-use

Engine, Microsoft Azure,
fixed-use units without longIBM Cloud
term commitments.
Consumers pay a certain

IaaS, PaaS,
Amazon AWS, Google App

amount of service up front and

SaaS

Subscription

Engine, Microsoft Azure,
get discounts and lower prices
IBM Cloud
from use.
IaaS, PaaS,

Amazon AWS, Google App

SaaS

Engine, Microsoft Azure,

Tiered
Multiple levels of services
Pricing
IBM Cloud
There are no fees for certain
Amazon AWS, Google App
Free-of-

services. Customer can use the

IaaS, PaaS,
Engine, Microsoft Azure,

charge

services for a certain time period

SaaS
IBM Cloud

with no payment.
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2.3.2 Dynamic pricing strategy
By adopting a dynamic pricing strategy, suppliers can flexibly modify prices according to
fluctuations in the market. If the modified price is lower than the fixed price, more customers
will be attracted since they can get the same service at a lower cost. This will increase provider
revenue. If the modified price is higher than the fixed price, the provider will also receive more
revenue due to the higher payment of each service. It is recommended to use a dynamic pricing
scheme to price the federated cloud resources to compensate the deficits, which are caused by the
fixed pricing algorithm, for both provider and customer based on supply and demand [40].
Hence, dynamic pricing strategies are more flexible and reasonable than fixed pricing strategies.
It can allocate available cloud resources to meet customer needs and balance customer budget
constraints (Table 2-6). Compared to the fixed pricing strategy, the advantage of dynamic pricing
strategy is to adjust price flexibly based on marketing conditions, especially the relation between
supply and demand. By this way, for providers, they can change price consistently according the
supply and demand; for customers, they have a great chance obtain the same QoS level of cloud
services but paying less [155-157].
TABLE 2-6
Dynamic Pricing Strategies
Pricing Mechanism

Pricing Objective and Explanations

Article

Cloud Market and Pricing
Three steps: define, evaluate, and select the best pairs of
Genetic Model

[109]
chromosomes. Genetic model is better than some
dynamic models and fixed pricing mechanisms.
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Compensating the deficits
Dynamic Pricing

For the federated cloud resources to compensate the

Scheme

deficits based on supply and demand. Benefit to both

[154]
providers and customers.
Formulating the competition
Markov Decision
Among providers, seeking more appropriate mechanisms

[158]

Process
to allocate cloud resources.
Dynamic resource allocation
Model Predictive
Dynamically and effectively adjusting prices for

[159]

Control Theory
available cloud resources.
Providing high QoS
Financial Option

Tracking real values of cloud resources to guarantee high

Theory

QoS for customers expectation and providers overall

[60]
quality performance.
Revenue optimization
Optimal Capacity
Especially for providers to maximize revenues under

[161]

Control
uncertainties and incomplete information.

2.3.3 Bidding pricing strategy
Applying economics game theory to price cloud services is a reasonable choice. Price
fluctuations can reflect the relationship between supply and demand in real time, providing
incentives and constraints for users to rationally choose resources. At the same time, the service
price can be used as the basis of resource allocation to realize service differentiation [162-164].
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The following table (Table 2-7) addresses the extant study using auction design to pricing
available cloud resources.

TABLE 2-7
Different Types of Auction Design
Type

Pricing Objective

Article

Maximizing provider’s revenue and shortening the
English Auction

[165] [166]
execution time, also solve NP-hardness.
Coping with changes in cloud market, such as
Asymptotic optimization, incentive compatibility,

Dynamic Auction

[167-169]
and computational complexity are integrated to
allocate available cloud resources.
Truthfulness and dynamic adjustment mechanisms

Marginal Bidding

to generate revenues for providers.

[170] [171]

This framework enables multiple customers to
Double Auction

purchase services from multiple providers. The
[172-174]

Bayesian Model

mechanism helps customers purchase cloud
resources flexibly.
This mechanism is suitable for cases requiring

Double-Sided
various services and where many participants exist.
Combination Auction

[175-177]
A double-sided auction model and K-pricing scheme

and K-Pricing Scheme
were used in this mechanism.

39
An auction design is better than the fixed-price
Auction-Greedy Design

mechanism. Furthermore, a greedy algorithm

[178-181]

generates more revenues than a linear programming.
Combinatorial Double

The economic efficiency of the cloud resources and
[182-185]

Auction

allocation is more important to providers.

2.3.4 Amazon AWS EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud) Spot Instance
“Amazon EC2 Spot instances are free computing power available in AWS services.
Compared with the price of on-demand instances, such instances can provide extra discounts.
EC2 Spot can help you optimize the cost of AWS services, and can increase application
throughput by 10 times without changing the budget. You only need to select "Spot" when
launching an EC2 instance to save 90% of the on-demand instance price. The only difference
between an on-demand instance and an auction instance is that when EC2 needs more capacity, it
will issue a two-minute notification and then interrupt the auction instance. You can use EC2
Spot for a variety of fault-tolerant and flexible applications, such as test and development
environments, stateless web servers, image rendering, and video transcoding to run analytics,
machine learning, and high-performance computing (HPC) workloads. EC2 Spot can also be
tightly integrated with other AWS products, including EMR, Auto Scaling, Elastic Container
Service (ECS), CloudFormation, etc. Offering you the flexibility to choose how to start and
maintain applications running on Spot instances” 6 [186-195]. Amazon.com is the first company
that implements an auction-like pricing strategy to cloud services [196-201]. Many scholars and

6

https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/
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practitioners are attempting to find some clues about how Amazon price the available cloud
resources by Spot Instances (Table 2-8).
Amazon AWS disclose Spot Instance pricing data each three month. Based on the
historical data, scholars try to decode and illustrate Amazon’s dynamic pricing processes. The
following table summarizes the relevant studies. A study indicates that Amazon AWS Spot
Instance is one of pricing strategies that offer dynamically changing prices based on market
changing conditions [202-204]. Wang, et al [205] proposed a specific model Lyapunov
Optimization as a future pricing strategy for Spot Instance. Singh and Dutta [209] used Mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE) to predict dynamic changes of Amazon Spot Instances.
Zhang, et al. [212] constructed predictive control theory for spot markets to resource allocation
in cloud computing environment. Wallace, et al. [215] adopted with Neural Network to predict
the spot prices.

TABLE 2-8
Amazon AWS Spot Instance Study
Pricing Mechanism

Finite Horizon Formulation and

Pricing Objective

Article

Revenue maximization
[202-204]

Sensitivity Analysis
Lyapunov Optimization

Revenue Optimization

Mean Absolute Percentage Error

Dynamic price prediction

[205-208]

[209-211]
(MAPE)
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Model Predictive Control Theory

Dynamic resource allocation

[212-214]

Deep Learning Algorithm (Neural Decoding and illustrating the
[215-218]
Network)

functionality of Spot Instance

2.4 Unsolved Issues from the Extant Cloud Pricing Strategy

2.4.1 Issues of Fixed Pricing Strategy.
(1) Vague relation between supply and demand. Cloud price fluctuated instantly based on
the changing market condition; in other words, price is an indicator of marketing condition.
However, fixed price cannot express the holistic picture of price changing trend.
(2) Potential revenue loss. If a provider employs the fixed pricing strategy all the time,
the price cannot be modified according to supply and demand. For instance, if the marketing
price is lower than the fixed price, customers may choose other provider’s services because that
provider offers lower price that is suit for customers’ budget constraints; if the marketing price is
higher than the fixed price, the provider who employs fixed pricing strategy cannot change price
easily. These two situations will lead to potential losses.
(3) Resource allocation is difficult to be optimized. Since price won’t change instantly
and dynamically, available cloud resources have great chance not to allocate to customers due to
fixed pricing strategy. Hence, provider won’t optimize revenues [59, 60].

2.4.2 Quality of Service (QoS) of Cloud Computing
Cloud service is the main form of cloud computing, and the quality of service is the
overall performance of cloud computing. Cloud QoS is defined as "the overall effect of users
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using cloud computing services. These effects determine user satisfaction. 7" The quality of cloud
services reflects whether cloud services meet Yonghua's expectations and whether user interests
are guaranteed. The SLA clarifies the rights and responsibilities and establishes participants’
trust in cloud business [219, 220].
Based on the existing pricing mechanisms, both participants are difficult to seek clues
that guarantee expected QoS performance, especially to customers. As indicated in Figure 2-6,
many critics are critical to QoS performance. Such as availability, reliability, latency, security,
throughput, capacity, scalability, elasticity, service & help, cost per customer, etc. In this thesis, I
proposed a model that includes QoS parameters, availability and response time, to estimate the
value of cloud resources. It is easy for participants to get a reserved price from the model [221,
222].
Customers have their own needs and expectations of computing services, they will refer
to the cloud service functions and prices of different providers when choosing providers and the
corresponding services, and strive to balance demand, expectations and costs. Hence, for
providers, QoS is a critical method to value service performance from perspectives of technology
and customer satisfaction. Providers can provide different service quality and service levels to
help meet the different levels of service needs of customers [223-225].
QoS has different explanations from different angles. Based on the usage of cloud
services, QoS can be considered as customer expectation and provider guarantee; after providers
offer cloud resources, QoS can be treated as customer recognition and provider accomplishment.
Because the proposed hybrid pricing mechanism is constructed for purchasing cloud services,

7

ITU-T Recommendation E.800. Definitions of Terms Related to Quality of Service [G]. Quality of
Telecommunication Services: Concepts, Models, Objectives and Dependability Planning? – Terms and Definitions
Related to the Quality of Telecommunication Services. ITU-T Study Group, 2008.
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QoS from customer expectation and of provider guarantee are considered in the thesis [226,
227].

Fig. 2-6. Critical QoS Metrics of Cloud Services
The cloud computing QoS is an expression about the level of cloud computing service
quality required by customers and indicates the degree of demand of customers for a certain QoS
service. Customers do not care about the details of service provision and design, but care about
the effectiveness and QoS. When describing QoS requirements, customers can use non-technical
language to express. These requirements are very important to providers. Providers need to
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design services from the perspective of customers QoS preferences. Providers define the
customers’ QoS requirements based on customers’ description of QoS and promise to guarantee
QoS by SLA (Service Level Agreement) [228].
QoS of cloud computing provided by providers represents the quality level that providers
plan to provision to customers. Providers use specific technical measurement parameters to
represent the QoS level that customers require. Each service has a unique QoS parameter set.
The QoS parameter sets of different services have different indicators, which are used to
represent different targeted values, ranges and levels. Providers should have two expressions for
QoS. One is for customer QoS using non-technical or non-professional language. The other is the
technical or professional expression used by providers internally [228, 229]. The following
picture (Fig. 2-7) indicates the relation between customer expected QoS and provider guarantee
QoS.

QoS

SLA

(Customer Expectation) (Service Level Agreement)

QoS
(Provider Guarantee)

Fig. 2-7. SLA between Customer’ and Provider’ QoS
The goal of cloud resources is to fulfill the requirements of customers and services at any
time and provide on-demand services to customers. But this is not an easy task. For providers,
the technical guarantee of cloud computing QoS still faces huge challenges. Cloud resource can
be treated as a normal good with unique QoS parameters [227-230].
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CHAPTER 3
QOS-BASED HYBRID PRICING STRATEGY

This chapter is dedicated to proposing QoS-based pricing model.

Current pricing methods are based on fixed pricing strategies. Fixed pricing is simple,
and buyers are easy to follow and accept. The problems are (1) the price of a resource cannot be
dynamically modified based on resource usage between supply and demand. Although some
major companies adopt bidding or dynamic pricing strategies for certain services, it is still
difficult to understand how the companies price the resources. It is argued that companies priced
resources based on traditional methodologies not dynamic pricing strategies. (2) cloud providers
will suffer potential revenue loss due to more potential customers will be involved and price will
be fluctuated along with the fixed price.
In order to improve the market competitiveness of providers and offset the weakness of
fixed pricing strategy in cloud computing, on the basis of different QoS requirements from
customers, I proposed a hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism that executes both fixed pricing
strategy (e.g., subscription) and dynamic pricing strategy (e.g., optimal auction design) to
calculate a reserved price for participants (providers and customers) and to allocate resources
among customers effectively and efficiently. Afterwards, the hybrid pricing mechanism has the
potential to help providers attract more customers with relatively lower price and gain more
revenues. Specifically, when the cost of cloud resource is higher than the marketing price in
cloud market, a fixed subscription price strategy will be adopted; when the marketing price is
higher than the cost of cloud resource but lower than the fixed price of cloud resource, a dynamic
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auction design will be implemented; when the marketing price is higher than the fixed price of
cloud resource but lower than the equilibrium price of cloud resource (when supply equals to
demand), a dynamic auction design will be implemented. Overall, the hybrid pricing mechanism
is able to explore both the two pricing strategies’ advantages and to provide supplier and
customer expected benefits [231, 232].
It is generally believed that an appropriate price mechanism is an effective way to better
allocate available cloud resource. The QoS level and performance of the cloud services obtained
is directly related to the expenses a customer needs to pay. If the same amount of cloud services
is used, the higher the performance or the higher QoS level of cloud services a customer requires,
the higher prices of the related cloud services will be [233, 234]. What the customer pays
depends on the price of the service conducted by cloud provider as well. The QoS-based pricing
model can reflect the needs of both providers and customers. Specifically, differentiated QoS
threshold represents different prices to cloud services. Different prices reflect the QoS
differences of the resources required by different customers, making the relationship between
price and QoS more reasonable [235,236]. The price itself reflects the customer's preference for
QoS. For the provider, the corresponding high-quality service can be provided according to the
different requirements of the customers’ QoS. It will be attracting more potential customers and
achieving higher profits. In this section, we address the issue of designing a novel hybrid pricing
mechanism that consists of fixed pricing strategy (subscription) and dynamic pricing strategy
(optimal auction design) as an advanced pricing mechanism through which cloud services are
priced, paired, and allocated [237-239].
With abundant resources, depending on customer expectation on different QoS
expectations for cloud services, customer budget constraints, and actual cloud service usage, we
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explore performance estimation and quality sensitivity pricing mechanism (hybrid QoS-based
pricing strategy) to make price setting and resource allocation more acceptable and reasonable
[239, 240].

3.1 Developing Stages of Cloud Industry
This section depicts the three development stages before the cloud market turns to be
mature. The details are described in figure 3-1. The proposed context is applicable to different
types of cloud companies and providers, such as large, medium, and small companies. Suppose
that in the market, supply is stable for all the time. In other words, all available cloud resources
from different providers can fulfill all customers’ demand. And, demand from customers will be
increasing from the initiating to maturing stage. The details are illustrated and explained in the
following (Fig. 3-1).

Fig. 3-1. Different Developing Periods of Cloud Industry
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3.1.1 The Initiating Stage
The initiating stage is between 𝑡 ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the cost
of cloud resource (C). In the market, there are only a few customers with plenty of cloud
resources from multiple providers. This stage is not a good time for companies to gain revenues,
but to attract potential customers. Also, it is not necessary to change the price instantly. A better
pricing strategy for company to adopt with is to offer customers discount or promotional price.
An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers free-of-charge for certain cloud services for
one year.
In the initiating stage, subscription (fixed pricing strategy) is used to present reserved
price for both providers and customers. Subscription is a better pricing strategy than pay-per-use.
For providers, they can offer lower price to attract more potential customers; for customers, they
can obtain expected cloud resources within their budget constraints. The initiating stage is the
early development of a cloud-relevant company, it is a good time for a company to improve its
performance of cloud services and to develop its operational activities in the cloud market. It is
the time period when customers begin to recognize cloud computing and start to use some
certain resources with only limited payment. The mathematical proof is described in Chapter 4.

3.1.2 The Developing Stage
The developing stage is between 𝑡 ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the
fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the cost of cloud resource (C). In the market,
the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the growth of cloud marketing. This stage is
the first time for companies start to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the fixed
pricing strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1. Hence, it is
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better for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy for company
to adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based on marketing
fluctuation between supply and demand. For a certain customer’s resources, a provider offers a
lower price, a lower price based on supply and demand will attract more customers to purchase
cloud resources, leading to the economies of scale. Companies will obtain more revenues overall
eventually. An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers Spot Instance for certain cloud
services.
In the developing stage, a double auction design (dynamic bidding pricing strategy) is
used to present reserved price and bidding procedures for both providers and customers. Auction
design is a better pricing strategy than fixed pricing strategy. For providers, they can offer
flexible-changing price to attract more potential customers; for customers, they can obtain
expected cloud resources within their budget constraints. Specifically, a dynamic auction design
is potential to avoid revenue loss in this stage, if more customers would like to be involved in the
auction process to bid for cloud services. They can obtain high level of QoS-guaranteed cloud
services, but to pay less compared to a fixed pricing strategy. Providers would continue to
improve the overall QoS performance to hold the market share. The mathematical proof is
described in Chapter 4.

3.1.3 The Maturing Stage
The maturing stage is between 𝑡 ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the
equilibrium price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ). In
the market, the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the growth of cloud marketing.
This stage is the good period for companies to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the
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fixed pricing strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1.
Hence, it is better for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy
for company to adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based
on marketing fluctuation between supply and demand. An example is Amazon AWS who offers
customers Spot Instance for certain cloud services.
In the maturing stage, a double auction design (dynamic bidding pricing strategy) is used
to present reserved price for both providers and customers. Auction design is a better pricing
strategy than fixed pricing strategy. For providers, they can offer flexible-changing price to
attract more potential customers; for customers, they can obtain expected cloud resources with
paying reasonable expenses. In this stage, the number of customers and companies will continue
to increase. Both customers and providers encounter more challenges. A dynamic auction design
is potential to leverage both parties’ risks and balance budget constraints and QoS expectations.
The mathematical proof is described in Chapter 4. The following table (Table 3-1) addresses
detailed pricing strategies for the three development stages.
TABLE 3-1
Developing Stages and Pricing Strategies
Developing

Time

Customer

Pricing

Price

Stage

Period

Quantity

Strategy

Scope

Initiating

𝑡 ~𝑡

Only A Few

Subscription

P<C

Developing

𝑡 ~𝑡
Increasing

Dynamic Auction Design

C<P<𝑃

51

Maturing

𝑡 ~𝑡

𝑃 <P<𝑃
A Lot Of

Dynamic Auction Design

3.2 Quality of Service (QoS) of Cloud Pricing

3.2.1 The Relation between QoS Metrics and Price
The QoS metrics (X) is consisting of availability (𝐴( ) ), elasticity (𝐸 ), reliability (𝑅 ),
security (𝑆 ), etc. The bidding price is based on the reserved price ( 𝑃 ) that is applicable to both
seller and buyer. x refers to all possible features that influence the performance of QoS in cloud
computing, such as CPU power, speed, storage, location, etc.
The QoS metrics (X):
𝑋
A (Availability), 𝐴
E (Elasticity), 𝐸
R (Reliability), 𝑅
S (Security), 𝑆
…
The function that expresses the reserved price is:
𝑃 = 𝐹(𝑋) = 𝐹(𝐴𝑥 , 𝐸𝑥 , 𝑅𝑥 , 𝑆𝑥 , … )

(3-1)

3.2.2 An Example of Relation between Availability and Price
The availability of cloud computing is one crucial QoS parameter, but it is difficult to
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quantifiably analyze, because cloud services are implemented through the entire serving process
in a complicated network that integrates software, hardware, and the related computing techniques.
Availability8 represents the percentile of the uptime of cloud services [68-70]. Better performance
of cloud services is intimately related to higher level of availability. A more stable system will
decrease the number of failures and will lessen the time spent in repairing.
The relationship between availability and Uptime and Downtime is
A=

(3-2)

=

A refers to availability. MTBF (Uptime) and MTTR (Downtime) are the two parameters of
cloud computing. MTBF is the Mean Time between Failure, and MTTR is the Mean Time to
Repair [227-232]. Thus, based on the above function, the availability can be increased either by
increasing the mean time interval between repairs (MTBF) or by decreasing the mean repairing
time (MTTR). The intuitive way to represent availability is by using the downtime and the Nines
and Fives, e.g., 2 Nines is 99% and 3N5 is 99.95%. The following table (Table 3-2) is an example.
TABLE 3-2
Representation of Availability

8

Availability

Downtime

99% (2-Nines)

3.65 days/year

99.5% (2N5)

1.825 days/year

99.9% (3-Nines)

8.76 hours/year

99.95% (3N5)

4.38 hours/year

99.99% (4-Nines)

52 minutes/year

The probability that the system will be up and will function correctly in a certain time period.
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99.995% (4N5)

26 minutes/year

99.999% (5-Nines)

5 minutes/year

Ideally, different QoS indicators can be integrated into the price function. The following
model is an example relation between availability (𝐴( ) ) and the reserved price (𝑃 ).
The function that expresses the availability is:
𝐴(

)

= 𝑔(𝑥)

(3-3)

The function that expresses the reserved price is:
𝑃 = 𝑓(𝐴( ) )

(3-4)

3.2.3 The Relation between Response Time and Price
Suppose at time t, customer agent submits a request of 𝑄 , the workload of provider 𝑗 is
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 =

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑

(3-5)

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑 is the total number of other accepted resource requests between time t and the
deadline, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥 is the maximum of resources that provider 𝑗 can provide.
Suppose that provider can fulfill all the accepted customers’ requests. The asking price
(𝐴𝑠𝑘 ) is proportional to the current workload (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 ). That is, as 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 increases, 𝐴𝑠𝑘 also
increases; vice versa. The expression is as follows,
𝐴𝑠𝑘 = 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐸𝑉 × (1 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 )

(3-6)

𝛼 indicates the degree of impact of the workload on the asking price. It satisfied that 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1.
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Suppose that all the accepted customers’ requests can be provided before the deadline.
The bidding price (𝐵𝑖𝑑 ) is proportional to the current workload (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 ). That is, as
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 increases, 𝐵𝑖𝑑 also increases; vice versa. The expression is as follows,

𝐵𝑖𝑑 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑉 × (1 + (

(3-7)

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑
) )
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 is the respond time of 𝑄 , which is a dynamic value. 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 = the current system
time – the submission time of 𝑄 . After 𝑄 is allocated to customer, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 will be kept
unchanged. 𝛽 indicates the degree of impact of the time on the bidding price. It satisfied that 0 ≤
𝛽 ≤ 1. At time t, the customer submits the service request (𝑄 ) and the bidding price (𝐵𝑖𝑑 ).
In the auctioning procedure, the asking prices are sorted in ascending order and the
bidding prices are sorted in descending order. If the maximal bidding price is greater or at least
equal to the minimal asking price, trading between customer and provider happens. The trading
price (P) is the mean of the maximal bidding price and the minimal asking price. Such as,

𝑃=

(3-8)

1
(𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝐴𝑠𝑘 )
2

The hybrid pricing mechanism is formalized as follows:
Price Function

1
𝑃 = (𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝐴𝑠𝑘 )
2

Pricing Strategy

Stages

Subscription

Initiating

Double Auction

Developing

Double Auction

Maturing
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CHAPTER 4
QOS-BASED CLOUD PRICING MODEL

This chapter is dedicated to describing the hybrid QoS-based pricing procedure.

Depending on the customer's different requirements for cloud services, suppliers need a
viable and efficient pricing mechanism that is critical to the allocation and optimization of the
available cloud resources. For suppliers, customers will bid for their own budget for better
service, and the suppliers will select customers based on their bids, provide resources for higherpriced customers and guarantee the cloud’s QoS (Fig. 4-1). For customers, they can freely
choose resources according to their own needs. However, due to the liquidity of marginal
customers, whose bidding is uncertain, and it is difficult to estimate the demand based on
existing bids. Hence, the cloud resource scheme based on uncertain bid auction has the potential
to improve both system efficiency and optimal profits.

Customer Request Queues
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Fig. 4-1. Transaction of Cloud Allocation and Pricing
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4.1 Subscription for The Initiating Stage

4.1.1 Problem Statement
Mathematical Proof of Subscription and Pay-per-use
The fixed price: 𝑃
The cost of service: C
The Price when demand is high: 𝑃(

)

The Price when demand is low: 𝑃(

)

Customer Consumption level when demand is high: 𝑋
Customer Consumption level when demand is low: 𝑋
Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is high: 𝑋( ,
Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is low: 𝑋( ,
Customer Utility Function: 𝑈 (𝑋

,𝑋

)

)

)

Customer Optimization:
max
,

,

s.t. 𝑋
𝑈 (𝑋

𝑈 (𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,
,𝑋

) − 𝑃(

,𝑋

),

𝑋

) − 𝑃(

)𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,
)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)𝑋

—𝑃

(4-2)

)

− 𝑃(

(4-1)

)𝑋

−𝑃 ≥0

4.1.2 Provider Optimization
Considering consumer optimization issues, cloud service providers will adopt appropriate
pricing mechanisms to maximize their own profits. Assume that the marginal cost of the services
provided by the cloud service provider is zero.
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𝑋∗ = 𝑋

(𝑃(

) , 𝑃(

), 𝑃

)

(4-3)

𝑋# = 𝑋

(𝑃(

) , 𝑃(

), 𝑃

)

(4-4)

+ 𝑃(

)𝑋

+𝑃 )−𝐶

(4-5)

max

, (

), (

(𝑃(

)𝑋

#

)

Where (𝑋 ∗ , 𝑋 # ) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋

s.t. 𝑋
𝑈 (𝑋

∗

(𝑃(

),

≤ 𝑋( ,

) − 𝑃(

,𝑋

)𝑋

∗

) − 𝑃(

,𝑋

)𝑋

+ 𝑃(

𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

− 𝑃(
)𝑋

#

)𝑋

)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)𝑋

−𝑃 ]

(4-6)

(4-7)

)

−𝑃 ≥0

+𝑃 )−𝐶 ≥0

4.1.3 Customer Optimization
max

, (

), (

(𝑃(

)𝑋

∗

+ 𝑃(

)𝑋

#

(4-8)

+𝑃 )−𝐶

)

Where (𝑋 ∗ , 𝑋 # ) = argmax [a log (X + 1) + b log(Y + 1) −
𝑃( ) 𝑋 − 𝑃( ) 𝑋 − 𝑃 ]

s.t. 𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

),

𝑋

a ∗ log (X + 1) + b ∗ log(Y + 1) − 𝑃(
(𝑃(

)𝑋

∗

+ 𝑃(

)𝑋

#

≤ 𝑋( ,
)𝑋

(4-10)

)

− 𝑃(

+𝑃 )−𝐶 ≥0

(4-9)

)𝑋

−𝑃 ≥0
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4.1.4 The Analysis of Different Types of Customer
The Homogeneous Customer
According to Cobb-Douglas Utility Function U (X, Y) = 𝑎 log (X+1) + b log(Y+1)
When customer demand is 0, and customer utility is 0 but not negative infinity 9.
Customer Optimization:
max a log (X + 1) + b log(Y + 1) − 𝑃(

)𝑋

,

s.t. 𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

),

𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

− 𝑃(

)𝑋

—𝑃

(4-11)

(4-12)

)

a log (X + 1) + b log(Y + 1) − 𝑃(

)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)𝑋

−𝑃 ≥0

Provider Optimization:

max

, (

), (

(𝑃(

)𝑋

s.t. 𝑋
,𝑋
(𝑃(

+ 𝑃(

)𝑋

#

(4-13)

+𝑃 )−𝐶

)

Where (𝑋 ∗ , 𝑋 # ) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋

𝑈 (𝑋

∗

≤ 𝑋( ,

) − 𝑃(
)𝑋

∗

) − 𝑃(

,𝑋

)𝑋

+ 𝑃(

),

𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

− 𝑃(
)𝑋

#

)𝑋

)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)

)𝑋

−𝑃 ]

(4-14)

(4-15)

−𝑃 ≥0

+𝑃 )−𝐶 ≥0

Proposition 1.

9

This not only simplifies the solution, but also explores how the utility function of homogeneous and heterogeneous
customers (marginal utility is gradually decreasing) impacts on the choice of provider’s pricing strategy.
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If provider adopts with pay-per-use, the optimal price 𝑃(
. And the optimal profit is: ∑ 𝑎 −
(,

)

(,

)

)

and 𝑃(

=
(,

)

)

=

− 𝐶 = ∑ [𝑎 1 −

+𝑏−
(,

+ 𝑏(1 −

)

(,

)

)] − 𝐶.
(,

)

Proposition 2.
If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is alog 𝑋( ,
𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1). And the optimal profit is: ∑ [alog 𝑋( ,

)

)

+1 +

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶.

The Heterogeneous Customer
Heterogeneous customers are divided into two categories. The one is divided into luxury
customer and poor customer according to the budget constraint (willingness to pay/afford). The
other category is divided into high-demand customers and low-demand customers.
I. Luxury and Poor Customers
Assuming that there are d luxury customers (i = 1) and g poor customers (i = 2), it
focuses on whether different level of budget constraint impacts the provider's pricing strategy.
Suppose the two categories of customers have the same consumption upper limits 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

),

)

and

and 𝑎 > 𝑎 , 𝑏 > 𝑏 .
Customer Optimization:
max a log (X + 1) + b log(Y + 1) − 𝑃(
,

s.t. 𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

),

𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

)

)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)𝑋

—𝑃

(4-16)

(4-17)
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a log (X + 1) + b log(Y + 1) − 𝑃(

)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)𝑋

−𝑃 ≥0

+ 𝑃 ) + 𝑔(𝑃(

)𝑋

+ 𝑃(

Provider Optimization:

max

, (

), (

𝑓(𝑃(

)𝑋

+ 𝑃(

)𝑋

(4-18)

)𝑋

)

+𝑃 )−𝐶

Where (𝑋 ∗ , 𝑋 # ) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋

s.t. 𝑋
𝑈 (𝑋

,𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

) − 𝑃(

(𝑃(

)𝑋

∗

) − 𝑃(

,𝑋

),

)𝑋

𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

− 𝑃(

+ 𝑃(

)𝑋

#

)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)𝑋

(4-9)

−𝑃 ]

(4-20)

)

)𝑋

−𝑃 ≥0

+𝑃 )−𝐶 ≥0

Proposition 3.
If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when d𝑋( ,

(,

)

; when f𝑋( ,

𝑑

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

)

+1

Otherwise, 𝑃(

> g, 𝑃(

+

)

)

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

=
(,

(,

+1

)

> g, the optimal price 𝑃(

Proposition 4.

=

)

+ 𝑔(𝑎 −
and 𝑃(

)

𝑎 𝑋( ,

)

𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

+𝑏 −

(,

𝑋( ,

)

+1

+

𝑏
𝑋( ,

)

+1

)−𝐶

. Meanwhile, the maximum profit

=
)

of provider is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔)

)

. And the optimal profit is:

=

)

)

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

−𝐶
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If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1).

)

And the optimal profit is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔)

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

−𝐶

II. High and Low-Demand Customers
Assuming that there are d high-demand customers (i = 1) and g low-demand customers (i
= 2), it focuses on whether different level of demand impacts the provider's pricing strategy.
Suppose the consumption upper limits of high-demand customers are 𝑋(
consumption upper limits of low-demand customers are 𝑋(
𝑋(

,

)

> 𝑋(

,

),

𝑋(

,

)

> 𝑋(

).

,

,

)

and 𝑋(

,

,

)
).

and 𝑋(

),

,

and the

Obviously,

Also, 𝑎 = 𝑎 = 𝑎, 𝑏 = 𝑏 = 𝑏.

Provider Optimization

max

, (

), (

(𝑃(

)𝑋

s.t. 𝑋
,𝑋
(𝑃(

+ 𝑃(

)𝑋

#

(4-21)

+𝑃 )−𝐶

)

Where (𝑋 ∗ , 𝑋 # ) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋

𝑈 (𝑋

∗

≤ 𝑋( ,

) − 𝑃(
)𝑋

∗

) − 𝑃(

,𝑋

)𝑋

+ 𝑃(

),

𝑋

≤ 𝑋( ,

− 𝑃(
)𝑋

#

)𝑋

)𝑋

− 𝑃(

)

−𝑃 ≥0

+𝑃 )−𝐶 ≥0

)𝑋

−𝑃 ]

(4-22)

(4-23)
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Proposition 5.
If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when g𝑋(
is high is 𝑃(

)

; when g𝑋(

=
( ,

)

,

,

> d, the optimal price when demand

)

> d, the optimal price when demand is low is 𝑃(

)

. The maximum profit of provider is:
( ,

)

𝑎𝑋(

(𝑑 + 𝑔)
Otherwise, 𝑃(

( ,

,

)

)

+1

and 𝑃(

=

)

𝑋(

,

)

)

+

𝑏𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

−𝐶

. Meanwhile, the maximum profit of

=
( ,

)

provider is:
𝑎𝑋(

𝑑

𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

+ 𝑔(

𝑎𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,
)

)

)−𝐶
+1

Proposition 6.
If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:
𝑎log 𝑋(

,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋(

,

)

+ 1).

And the optimal profit is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔) alog 𝑋(

,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋(

,

)

+ 1) − 𝐶

Corollary 1.
Subscription can help cloud service providers get more profit. In other words,
subscription is a better pricing mechanism than pay-per-use.

)

=
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4.2 Dynamic Auction Design for Both Developing and Maturing Stages

4.2.1 Problem Statement
The hybrid pricing mechanism is formalized below:
(1) There exist m sellers, M = {𝑚 , j = 1, 2, …, m}. The sellers (𝑚 , j = 1, 2, …, m) themselves
are also the cloud providers, like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, IBM, etc. Each provider is
represented by an agent.
(2) There exist n buyers, N= {𝑛 , j = 1, 2, …, n}. The customers (𝑛 , i = 1, 2, …, n) are also the
bidders, who could be individuals, companies, or institutions, etc.
(3) Second price sealed-bid double auction design. In order to avoid cheating or any strategic
maneuvering, a second price sealed-bid auction is adopted with. The winning bidder will pay the
second highest price for the cloud services payment. Customers have more incentives to bid, due
to less expenses they will pay.
(4) Individual Rationality (IR): All participants (provider and customer) are rational. In other
words, each participant would seek some benefit through the procedure, otherwise, no participant
wants to join the auction. For instance, customer i’s bid should be greater than the marketing price
(P), at least the two prices are equal: 𝐵 ≥ P. on the other side, the marketing price (P) should be
greater than provider’s estimation (𝐵 ), to the most provider’s bid equals to the marketing price:
P ≥ 𝐵 . In practice, IR is a natural phenomenon that applicable to each unit in game theory. Each
participant has the incentive to act in an auction design, because of the potential nonnegative gains
through bidding auction procedure.
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(5) Truthfulness (TF): Truthfulness is also known as incentive compatibility (IC) or
strategy-proof [34, 35]. Based on Nash Equilibrium, each participant should report a truthful value
(V) if he or she intend to optimize profits and utility. Otherwise, if some of the participants choose
untruthfully bidding (𝐵 ≠ 𝑉 𝑜𝑟 𝐵 ≠ 𝑉 ), they will suffer potential losses. Truthfulness is critical
in maintain a well-being environment in the cloud computing business: a trusted, fairness, and
efficient market.
(6) Assume that within time T, all customers have submitted a total of s requests, e.g., Q = {𝑄 , s
= 1, 2, …}. Each request from a customer is consisted of five components.
𝑄 = (𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 , 𝐵𝑢𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 ).
Such as, 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 is the budget that is for 𝑄 , 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 is the submission time of 𝑄 ,
𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 is the running time of 𝑄 , 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 is the due time of 𝑄 .
(7) 𝑀𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 is the longest responding time of 𝑄 that a customer can tolerant.
𝑀𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 −𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
(8) The participant's goal is to bid the service for the minimal expenses before the deadline. The
provider seeks to maximize resource revenue. Hence, the resource provider will raise the asking
price if possible, and the customer will give a relatively lower bid.

4.2.2 Proposition and Conditions

Proposition 7.
An economically efficient auction design can get the same profits as a fixed pricing
strategy.
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Proposition 8.
A double auction pricing mechanism can generate more revenues than an economically
efficient auction design.

Corollary 2.
A double auction pricing mechanism is more appropriate for provider or customer to
employ than a fixed pricing strategy.
The detailed proof is in the following section and appendix.

4.3 The Bidding Procedure

In this section, the detailed bidding procedure and algorithms are illustrated and
discussed. There are no unusual steps in the proposal auction design, only the first step is
different from the classical mechanisms. For instance, the first step is reserved QoS-based
pricing model, the second step is bids submission, the third step is bids matching, the fourth step
is winner determination, the fifth step is marketing price calculation, the last step is transaction
and payment. The detailed procedures are depicted in the following picture (Fig. 4-2).

4.3.1 Step I: Reserved QoS-based Pricing Model
This step estimates the relation between the QoS indicators and reserved price of cloud
resources. The QoS indicators include availability (𝐴 ), elasticity (𝐸 ), reliability (𝑅 ), security
(𝑆 ), etc. The reserved price of cloud service is 𝑃 . The function is
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𝑃 = 𝐹(𝑋) = 𝐹(𝐴𝑥 , 𝐸𝑥 , 𝑅𝑥 , 𝑆𝑥 , … )

(4-24)

Specifically, 𝑃 is a reference to both provider and customer. Both parties send their bids

based on the reserved price respectively. The customer i’s bid is 𝐵𝑖𝑑 , and the provider j’s bid is
𝐴𝑠𝑘 .

4.3.2 Step II: Bids Submission
Customers provide their bids and QoS preferences to the auctioneer, providers act the same
process as well.
Customers’ bids:
𝐵 ,…, 𝐵 ,…

(4-25)

𝐴𝑠𝑘 ,…, 𝐴𝑠𝑘 ,…

(4-26)

Providers’ bids:

4.3.3 Step III: Pairing Bids
Providers have capability to fulfill different types of cloud services along with all QoS
requirements as customers expected. Specifically,
𝑋 ≥𝑋

4.3.4 Step IV: Winner Determination

(4-27)
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Customers’ bids are ordered decreasingly, while providers’ bids are sorted increasingly.
All participants are truthful bidders, aiming at the complete process is monotonic [241-246].
Lemma 1: If one customer can win with bidding of 𝐵 , he or she will continue to win for
any (𝐵 > 𝐵 ) bid.

4.3.5 Step V: Marketing Price Calculation
Revenue-approximating scheme
In the auction, the price paid by the winning customer equals the second highest price. The
pricing rule can attract more customers with budget constraint and avoid strategy maneuver [5456].
Based on Equations 3-7 and 3-8, a winning customer i’s bidding price (𝐵𝑖𝑑 ) is the second
highest bids:
𝐵𝑖𝑑 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑

= 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑉 × (1 + (

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑
) )
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥

(4-28)

Hence, a winning customer marketing price (P):
𝑃 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑

(4-29)

4.3.6 Step VI: Transaction
Based on SLA and the bidding procedure, an agreement between winning customer and
provider will be executed. The customer pays the winning cloud resource by the second highest
price, the provide provisions the winning resource through the Internet.
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Fig. 4-2. The Detailed QoS-based Bidding Procedure
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CHAPTER 5
LIMITATION AND FUTURE DIRECTION

This chapter is dedicated to discussing limitations and potential research directions.

5.1 The Issues of Current Cloud Pricing Mechanisms
Several other interests may attract future study. It would be attractive to establish a
uniform and fully competitive auction mechanism [251, 252] to allocate resources to more
customers, like individual, small companies, medium companies, and even big companies.
Another important feature of cloud service is that we need to carefully consider the reusability.
Cloud services can also be reused. Some users may complete the tasks before the bidding
contract, and it is best to resell the resources they have [253. 254]. If there is no effective auction
mechanism that the users can use, it will be difficult to resell the services because of the time
issue. Future auction designs can illustrate reusability issues in the algorithms [255-257].
Providers will compete with each other and will submit bids related to a guaranteed QoS.
The mathematical issue (NP-Hardness) and the computational complexity should be carefully
considered, as well [258]. Another direction to consider is to adjust the QoS metrics. We
employed only the availability as the indicator of QoS of this study. Multiple indicators, such as
security, can be added to represent the exponential relationship between price and QoS. The
more QoS metrics that are added into the auction algorithm, the more accurate and practical the
estimates will be. There are malicious indicators representing cloud QoS [259, 260]. Thus, the
algorithms embedded with QoS metrics are more complicated than normal mathematical models.
A potential approach is to implement deep learning algorithms to estimate real values of cloud
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resources, according to the training layer (historical pricing records) and the output layers
(estimation results) [261-264]

5.2 The Marketing Condition of Supply and Demand
In the thesis, the proposed hybrid pricing strategy works only for the marketing condition
that demand is not greater than supply. This situation is very similar as cloud industry in practice.
Cloud computing is still on the early stage, more and more institutions and companies are joining
its development, and more and more users (companies or individuals) are becoming familiar with
cloud-relevant resources. In the nearly future, cloud services will be more popular around the
world. Hence, a complete marketing condition, including supply is less than demand, supply
equals to demand, and supply is greater than demand, should be considered and discussed.
According to different marketing condition, provider or customer can use distinguished pricing
strategy to optimize profits as expected. Furthermore, beyond marketing conditions, there exist
many dynamic mechanisms that can suit for pricing cloud computing, from technological
perspective, revenue optimization perspective, or economic efficiency, etc. in other words,
pricing strategy is always a critical factor impacting the development of cloud computing, the
success of companies, and the benefits of end-users.

5.3 The Decentralized Cloud Trading Platform
In a cloud environment, application scalability benefits both providers and customers.
Customers need on-demand and QoS-guaranteed cloud services. The dominant pricing strategies
of leading companies that market the cloud is to use certain fixed pricing models to sell their
cloud-related services. Auction design is a viable and an effective method for pricing cloud
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service. The decentralized P2P cloud trading platform is a good complement to the centralized
cloud pricing mechanisms [265-268].
The blockchain and its relevant mechanisms are quickly emerging and are increasingly
being applied in industries. As a decentralized system, the blockchain has been attracting more
and more attention because of its popular features, such as decentralization, mutual trust,
transparency, traceability and unforgeability, anonymity, credibility, etc. [269-272]. The
integration of blockchain and cloud computing is a good example of a blockchain application.
The blockchain has the potential to provide a decentralized trading network for peer-to-peer
transactions. The participants are flexible enough to be able to prosecute transactions through a
blockchain-based trading system [273, 274].
Depending on each customer's different QoS requirements for cloud services [68], [232],
users need a viable and efficient pricing system that is adaptable to the allocation and
optimization of the available cloud resources. The buyers will bid for their own QoS preferences
for better service, and the sellers will select buyers based on their bids, provide resources for
higher-priced buyers, and guarantee the cloud’s QoS. Buyers can freely choose resources
according to their own needs. However, due to the liquidity of marginal customers, whose
bidding is uncertain, it may be difficult to estimate the demand based on the existing bids [222].
The decentralized P2P cloud trading platform has the potential to improve both economic
efficiency and optimal profits. Also, the platform can set up a relatively free trading environment
without unnecessary intervention and avoiding various costs [274, 275]. The characteristics of
the seller and the buyer can be exchanged through the blockchain-based trading system
5.2.1 Adaptability of Blockchain in Cloud Computing
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As a distributed shared ledger, the blockchain implements chained storage by
implementing one-way connections of adjacent blocks by hash values. Each node of the
blockchain has a complete copy of the ledger. It is convenient to view and to prove transaction
data in real time. The openness and transparency of the distributed ledger records can effectively
maintain data security and transaction smoothness. Using blockchain technology, the anonymity
of the transaction and the no data caching function provide important guarantees for P2P
transactions and for two-way interaction [265, 266]. The decentralized verification process is
separated from any unnecessary centralized intervention, such as auctioneer, government
agencies, and banking organizations. Its decentralized features are consistent with the noncentral characteristics of distributed resources. Thus, the blockchain-based distributed cloud
trading system can realize the immediate settlement of benefits, and the P2P direct transaction
also greatly reduces the intermediate costs [275-277]. In this study, the blockchain platform is a
hybrid decentralized system that consists of sellers, buyers, and necessary third parties, such as a
supervision authority or a financial institution.

5.2.2 Theoretical Framework
The system has been designed into three layers (Fig. 5-1). The user layer is responsible
for providing user services and cloud service management, such as user registration, user login,
public and private key management, cloud service transaction information, and user right
inquiry. On the hybrid blockchain platform, users consist of three groups of participants: the
seller (provider), the buyer (customer), and third parties, such as a supervision authority or a
financial institution. Any entity that intends to join the network needs to apply for that right,
which will be assessed through certain standards for each of the three groups, respectively. Only
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authorized users can register and access the platform. In this way, nonqualified participants have
no chance to be involved with the system. The hybrid platform keeps the trading procedure more
secure and straightforward. The user layer also takes control of the public and private keys and
the transaction information, in order to assist the involved participants to track the related records
in a safe and transparent manner. In the hybrid decentralized trading system, the QoS Monitor is
in charge of collecting, recording, and estimating the relationship of QoS availability and price,
based on previous trading record.

Fig. 5-1 Blockchain-based Decentralized Cloud Trading Platform
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The trading layer implements the auctioning procedure. A continuous double auction
design is embedded in the hybrid blockchain system, and it executes bidding, matching, and
trading. A double auction offers both buyer and seller the opportunity to bid for cloud resources,
such that a buyer can obtain a service at a lower price, while a seller can acquire better revenue.
The continuity design provides users (the seller and the buyer) with more chances to trade cloud
resources. For instance, for the first time, a deal might not occur, due to the disagreement
between seller and buyer. Both the seller and the buyer can bid again for another cloud resource.
Or, a previous buyer could change to be a seller, who intends to sell cloud resources via the
proposed auction network, because cloud resources still exist after what the previous buyer had
bought. The detailed auction processes will be addressed in the Section that discusses The
Auction Procedure.
In the transaction layer, the blockchain will be generated. Consensus is the core issue of
blockchain technology in a decentralized environment. The mechanism adopted is DPoS
(Delegated Proof of Work) [278-280], which defines the stake as proof of the higher price
associated with the QoS being guaranteed. Specifically, the system will assign the right of block
ledger to the node that represents the potential winning price associated with the guaranteed QoS
of cloud services. Under this circumstance, aiming at competing for the right to ledger, suppliers
will seek to improve QoS or to cut costs of cloud service. To customers, they will obtain higherperformance or lower-price cloud services. The complete network can process in a virtuous ecosystem. As an important program in the blockchain system, smart contracts include a series of
transaction information, such as trading hours, amounts, buyers and sellers, and categories of
cloud service. Smart contracts can update content in a timely manner, based on various factors in
the decentralized trading market.
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5.2.3 Peer-to-Peer Trading Mechanism
The blockchain is a decentralized technology that enables peer-to-peer transactions
through cloud service providers, cloud users, authorities, and financial institutions as nodes that
integrate and constitute the blockchain network. The blockchain guarantees transaction security,
transparency, and data reliability through digital signatures, consensus mechanisms, smart
contracts, and asymmetric encryption algorithms [273-276]. Blockchain technology ensures that
any node can implement interconnection and P2P transactions.
The blockchain-based cloud trading platform estimates the current trading duration,
based on previous trading time. The blockchain platform confirms the reputation value of each
node and ranks the values in descending order. The system collects the buyers’ bids and relevant
information and arranges them in descending order, whereas the system collects the sellers’
prices and the relevant information and arranges them in ascending order. According to the
reputation value, each node of the buyer/seller will be given a matching range of reputation. The
platform broadcasts a sorted list, and each node can match the range. The node decides whether
to conduct the transaction: 1) The node confirms the transaction, and the system reviews the
transaction. If the transaction is verified, a smart contract is generated. The buyer and the seller
ultimately confirm the execution of the contract through multiple signatures and credit the
reputation after the transaction is completed. If the verification fails, it is determined that the
transaction was unsuccessful, and the node enters the next round of auctioning. 2) The node is
inconsistent with the transaction, and the system again prompts the node to determine whether to
adjust the bid or the transaction volume. If the node adjusts the bid or the volume, the previous
transaction step is repeated until the transaction is completed; if the node does not adjust the bid
or volume, the transaction is terminated directly.
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5.2.4 Calculate Node Reputation Values and Matching Ranges
The value of node reputation is 𝑅 . Each node can select a trading party as the selectable
range 𝜇 . If a node has not completed a match before the expiration time of a transaction period,
the system may determine that the node is inactive during the current time period and will use the
appropriate reputation value as the penalty deduction. Through the list of reputation values, the
system can not only reward reputable nodes, but also can encourage market integrity transactions,
and can cancel the recording rights of inactive nodes or malicious nodes to correctly operate the
decentralized trading platform [281]. 𝑅 = [𝑅 , 𝑅 , … 𝑅 ] and 𝜇 = [𝜇 , 𝜇 , … 𝜇 ]. The function
of 𝑅 is

𝑅 =

1
∗
2

𝛿
+
𝜃

𝜃
𝑡

5-1
, 𝑅 ∈ (0,1)

𝛿 is the number of node k’s the good reputation, 𝜃 is the number of node k’s real transaction,
and 𝑡 is the number of node k’s bidding. 𝑅 is determined by the percentage of good reputation
and the percentage of participating active. The function of 𝜇 is
5-2

𝜇 = 𝑁 ∗ (1 − 𝑅 )

𝑁 represents the number of nodes that finish transaction in a trading cycle. Table V is the
matching range for the six nodes, according to Table 5-1.
TABLE 5-1
Matching Range Based on Node Reputation Value
Customer Reputation Selectable Provider Reputation
Rank

Providers

Rank

Selectable
Customers
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𝐵

Top 10%

𝐵 ,𝐵 𝐵

𝐵

Top 60%

𝐵 ,𝐵 ,𝐵

𝐵

Top 60%

𝐵 ,𝐵

𝐵

Top 30%

𝐵 ,𝐵

𝐵

Top 30%

𝐵

𝐵

Top 10%

𝐵

5.2.5 Comparison between Traditional and Decentralized Trading Systems
Traditional cloud transactions rely on third-party institutions such as banks, with many
transaction processes that lead to low efficiency and long durations. All of the data, such as user
account information and transaction history, is stored and regulated in the centralized
organization's database. The security and privacy are poor; once the database is attacked, the data
is difficult to recover. Users only have their own records and cannot know the transaction records
of other users; thus, the establishment of the mutual trust market is affected [282], [283].
In a blockchain-based decentralized cloud trading system, each node becomes an
independent seller or buyer, and each entity is evenly dispersed. The form of direct P2P cloud
trading has the potential to reduce unnecessary costs, such as power loss and transaction costs. It
is also possible to conduct cloud transactions between nodes in different regions and to allocate
cloud P2P transactions across regions [284, 285]. All of the transactional information and nodes
can be anonymous, to ensure users’ privacy and security. The decentralized platform eliminates
the need for a central auctioneer, improves data sharing and security, optimizes revenues and
efficiency, and increases mutual trust between market entities [286, 287]. The following table
(Table 5-2) briefly addresses the differences between the centralized and the decentralized cloud
trading platforms.
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TABLE 5-2
Differences between Centralized and Decentralized Trading Platform
Feature
Trading Mode

Centralized

Decentralized

Centralized (Auctioneer)

Decentralized (No Intervention)

Resource Consuming

High

Low

Transaction Cost

High

Low

Data Storage

Central Database

Decentralized Ledger

Data Security

Low

High

Data Privacy

Low

High

Information Transparency

Low

High

Supervised

Freedom

Flexibility

In a cloud environment, the dominant pricing strategies of leading companies that market
the cloud is to use certain fixed pricing models to sell their cloud-related services. Auction
design is a viable and an effective method for pricing cloud service. The decentralized P2P cloud
trading platform is a good complement to the centralized cloud pricing mechanisms [288, 289].

5.4 The Impact of QoS-based Pricing Strategy on Customer Purchasing Behavior

Another direction is an empirical study that adopts with the Unified Theory of
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) to study acceptance and use of cloud service in a
consumer context [290-292]. Our model conducted seven constructs into UTAUT: performance
expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating condition, price value, QoS
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expectation, network externalities, and practical risks. Individual perspectives, such as age,
gender, and experience, have moderating effects on behavioral intention and cloud service use.
The researched model is depicted in the following (Fig. 5-2).

Performance
Expectancy
Effort
Expectancy
Social
Influence
Facilitating
Conditions

Behavioral

Use

Intention

Behavior

Price
Value
Quality of
Service (QoS)
Network
Externalities

Mediating Variables
Age

Gender

Experience

Potential
Risks

Fig. 5-2 The Research Model of Cloud-based UTAUT

Based on the model, two research questions will be investigated:
1. What factors influence consumer’s purchasing behavior of cloud service?
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The first four variables of UTAUT, performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social
influence, facilitating condition, have systematically investigated and explained in the extant
study [290], [293, 294], the other four factors, price value, QoS expectation, network
externalities, and practical risks, have not yet indicated very well. This study will focus on the
last four variables. For instance, for price value, consumers are price sensitive whether they have
budget constraint or not, they would seek to save expenses but obtain the same level of cloud
resources. QoS (Quality of Service) is a critical indicator to estimate cloud resource value and to
attract potential consumers [23]. There is no such study in IS to illustrate this phenomenon.
Cloud computing has the potential to benefit consumers much more, if more consumers join the
cloud systems. From a company or provider, how to conduct cloud computing platform to
perform the network externalities of cloud computing is an interesting thinking in practice.
Furthermore, more and more consumers accept and use cloud services, there exist potential risks
when using. How to effectively control or avoid potential risks will be always a hot topic
towards cloud computing implementation and cloud industry.
2. What different consumer purchasing behaviors between China and US?
For the second research question, there will be a comparison between consumers from
US and China, we will collaborate two popular cultural research frameworks together to explore
the study: Hofstede Cultural Framework [295, 296] and Schwartz Polar Dimension [297-300].
Among these, Hofstede Cultural Framework is the mostly used guidance to analyze cultural
differences between two cultures; Schwartz Polar Dimension will be employed as well,
especially some of important factors that don’t discussed in Hofstede Cultural Framework.
The empirical results were from two portions of survey, with the same questionnaires
data collected from Chinese and American individual consumers. In total, 5000 consumer data
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are validated and support our hypotheses. There exist several different purchasing behaviors
toward cloud services between consumers from China and US.
The goals and contribution of the empirical study are:
(1) To summarize and explain the extant UTAUT relevant models:
(2) To construct determinants that impact consumer purchasing behavior toward cloud
services:
(3) To empirically validate the derived UTAUT: An empirical test of
We conducted an extensive survey of individual consumers from both China and US to
figure out what factors impacting their decision on purchasing cloud services based on the
proposed UTAUT model. this survey provides important benchmarking information for
individual customers and cloud providers seeking to understand how cloud relevant companies
compose their pricing strategies and how to improve the comprehensive cloud resources quality
to attract more potential customers and make more revenues.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This chapter is dedicated to concluding the study.

The pricing mechanism is one of the core elements of a business model. A good pricing
mechanism is a key factor for the success of cloud industry. The research of cloud pricing has
far-reaching significance for the development of cloud computing. It is of great theoretical and
practical significance for cloud service providers to formulate reasonable pricing strategies in
order to attract more potential customers and obtain more profits. Once applied appropriately, the
pricing mechanisms can change consumer purchasing behavior and determine the competitive
position of cloud service providers in the market. This article synthesizes the research on pricing
strategies related to cloud computing services and proposed a hybrid QoS-based cloud pricing
mechanism. Based upon the pricing theory and game theory, the hybrid pricing mechanism is
more beneficial to cloud service providers and customers.
The proposed hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism has the following advantages. (1)
Solving Problems of Fixed Pricing Strategy. The price of a resource cannot be dynamically
modified based on resource usage between supply and demand. Cloud providers will suffer
potential revenue loss due to more potential customers will be involved and price will be
fluctuated. The QoS level and performance of the cloud services obtained is directly related to
the expenses a customer needs to pay. If the same amount of cloud services is used, the higher
the performance or the higher QoS level of cloud services a customer requires, the higher prices
of the related cloud services will be. (2) The QoS-based pricing model can present a clear
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reserved price to both providers and customers. Differentiated QoS threshold represents different
prices to cloud services; the price itself reflects the user's preference for QoS. Overall, the hybrid
pricing mechanism can explore both the two pricing strategies’ advantages and to provide
supplier and customer expected benefits. (3) Attractive to customers. Based on budget
constraints, customers could customize cloud services as they expect. Customers have good
opportunity to price/bid the expected cloud services.
This study potentially plays important roles in academia and practice. This is the first
paper combine QoS metrics (technological perspective of cloud computing) and dynamic pricing
mechanisms (subscription and auction design) together. It is potential to offer certain insights
and guidance for researchers who are interested in pricing cloud computing. For instance, many
different types of auction can be designed and explored, especially double and combinatorial
auction designs. QoS metrics are good variables to estimate values of cloud computing, and
cloud computing includes other technological factors impacting the overall performance and
price. A hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism is built to effectively distribute available cloud
resources based on marketing conditions, such as when supply > demand, pricing strategy is
different based on marketing price. The pricing strategy adopted with should benefit to providers
or customers, aiming at achieving better outcomes. The model presents an appropriate reserved
price of cloud resources, which will be as reference to both providers and customers. Throughout
the complete pricing process, a provider could easily locate its own pricing strategies and the
status of its cloud computing development; a customer could easily seek available cloud services
based on its own QoS expectations and budget constraints.
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APPENDICES

A.1 Comparison between Subscription and Pay-Per-Use
The cloud service provider chooses the price mechanism and sets the price, and then
customer decides whether to accept it. Since information services usually experience peak
periods and idle periods, if customers have different utility functions in different periods, then
when cloud service providers choose to price, the price settings will be different. For example,
Amazon AWS sets peak and idle periods based on customer demand, and charges different
service prices for two different periods. In addition, due to budget constraint and time limitation,
for customers, the marginal utility is decreasing, so it can be assumed that there is an upper limit
when customers use a certain cloud service. Since cloud service is also an information service,
assuming that the marginal cost of cloud service is zero.
The pricing strategy of subscription (fixed pricing strategy) will be employed in the
initiating stage. The following steps are the proof of subscription is better than pay-per-use. By
this pricing mechanism, cloud providers will have a great chance to attract more potential
customers. Due to the price of cloud resources will be lower if providers adopt with subscription
as their major pricing strategy.

A.1.1 The Homogeneous Customer

Proposition 1.
If provider adopts with pay-per-use,
The optimal price will be:
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=

(

)

− 1, the profit will be maximal as
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If provider adopts with subscription,
the optimal price will be:
alog 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)

(A1-6)

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶

(A1-7)

And the optimal profit will be:
[alog 𝑋( ,

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( ,

)

Proof of Proposition 2
When providers use subscription pricing, consumers choose service portfolio based on
demand and pay a fixed price. i.e., 𝑃(

)

= 0, 𝑃(

)

= 0, 𝑃 > 0.

Under this situation, customers would like to choose the maximal purchasing level for
both 𝑋( ,

)

and 𝑋( ,

).

Therefore, the optimal profit will be,

[alog 𝑋( ,

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( ,

)

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶

(A1-8)

)

+ 1)] ≥ 𝐶

(A1-9)

In order to optimize the profit, we have,
[alog 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( ,

So, the optimal price from provider will be alog 𝑋( ,
optimal profit will be ∑ [alog 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( ,

)

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

+ 1), and the

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶.

Based on Proposition 1 & 2, we have,
alog 𝑋( ,
And both 𝑋( ,

)

)

+1 >1−

and 𝑋( ,

(,

)

)

, and 𝑏 log(𝑋( ,

)

+ 1) >1 −

;
(,

)

are greater than 0,

Hence,
a ∗ log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + b ∗ log(𝑋( ,

)

+ 1) > 𝑎 1 +

1
𝑋( ,

)

+1

+ 𝑏(1 −

1
𝑋( ,

)

)
+1
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A.1.2 The Heterogeneous Customer
Heterogeneous customers are divided into two categories. The one is divided into luxury
customer and poor customer according to the budget constraint (willingness to pay/afford). The
other category is divided into high-demand customers and low-demand customers according to
the demand level.

I. Luxury and Poor Customers

Proposition 3.
If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when d𝑋( ,

(,

)

; when f𝑋( ,

𝑑

)

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

> g, 𝑃(
)

+1

Otherwise, 𝑃(

)

+

)

(,

)

(,

+ 𝑔(𝑎 −

+1

)

=

)

)

=

)

. And the optimal profit is:

=

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

> g, the optimal price 𝑃(

)

and 𝑃(

)

𝑎
𝑋( ,

+1

)

+𝑏 −

𝑏
𝑋( ,

)

)−𝐶
+1

. Meanwhile, the optimal profit of

=
(,

)

provider is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔)

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

−𝐶

Proof of Proposition 3
If pay-per-use is the pricing strategy, 𝑃(

)

> 0, 𝑃(

)

> 0, 𝑃 = 0.

Solve the first derivatives of the optimal price:
𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑎
𝑃(

−1
)

(A1-10)

126

𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑏

(A1-11)

−1

𝑃(

)

𝑎
𝑃(

(A1-12)

−1
)

𝑏
𝑃(

(A1-13)

−1
)

The optimal profits of provider:
𝑎 𝑋( ,

𝑑

𝑋( ,

max
(

)

)

+1

𝑑(𝑃(

), (

+

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

) 𝑋( ,

)

=

)

)

), (

+1

+ 𝑃(

max
(

)

+ 𝑔(𝑎 −

) 𝑋( ,

𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃(

𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

))

+ 𝑔 𝑃(

)

+ 𝑏 − 𝑃(

+1

) 𝑋( ,

+𝑏 −

)

𝑏
𝑋( ,

+ 𝑃(

) 𝑋( ,

+ 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃(

)

)

)

)−𝐶
+1
)

−𝐶

+ 𝑏 − 𝑃(

))

)

According to Proposition 1, cloud providers need to employ an appropriate pricing to
optimize the potential revenues. Let’s consider the following function first,
max 𝑑(𝑃(
(

)

) 𝑋( ,

)) +

𝑔 𝑃(

) 𝑋( ,

)

= max 𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃(
(

)

+ 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃(

))

)

In order to optimize the above function,
𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

≤ 𝑃(

)

≤

𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

Cloud provider is difficult to differentiate different types of customers, they need an
identical pricing strategy to optimize their revenues. Meantime, in order to maximize the utility,
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the luxury customers would like to optimize their demand as 𝑋( ,

),

and poor customers’

demand will increase because of the decreasing of market price of cloud services. Hence,
max 𝑑 𝑃(
(

= max 𝑑(𝑃(
(

)

When 𝑑𝑋(
otherwise, 𝑃(

)

)

)) +

)

𝑔 𝑎 − 𝑃(

+ 𝑔 𝑃(
)

) 𝑋( ,

)

= max 𝑔𝑎 + (𝑑𝑋(
(

)

,

)

− 𝑔)𝑃(

> 𝑔, the optimal price when the demand is maximal is 𝑃(

)

)

=

)

=

,
(,

)

(,

)

.

=
(,

When 𝑑𝑋(
otherwise, 𝑃(

)

,

) 𝑋( ,

) 𝑋( ,

)

)

,

)

> 𝑔, the optimal price when the demand is minimal is 𝑃(

,

.

=
(,

)

Proposition 4.
If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1).

And the optimal profit is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔)

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

−𝐶

Proof of Proposition 4
According to Proposition 2, cloud provider’s asking price to the luxury customer is:
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)

)

+ 1)

Cloud provider’s asking price to the poor customer is:
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,
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Since cloud provider cannot differentiate different types of customers, in order to
optimize the revenues, the provider has to hold the luxury customers, not to attract the poor
customers. The asking price to both two types of customers should be
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,
Also, 𝑎 <

)

𝑎 and 𝑏 <

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)

𝑏

Then, the optimize profits of provider is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( ,
Because 𝑋( ,

)

≥ 0 and 𝑋( ,

𝑑

+𝑏 −

𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

)

+

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶

≥ 0,
𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

+ 𝑔(𝑎 −

) − 𝐶 < (𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( ,

)

𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶

Hence, cloud providers could obtain more revenues if they adopt with subscription
instead of pay-per-use.

II. High and Low-Demand Customers

Proposition 5.
If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when g𝑋(
is high is 𝑃(

)

=
( ,

)

; when g𝑋(

,

)

,

> d, the optimal price when demand

)

> d, the optimal price when demand is low is 𝑃(

. The optimal profit of provider is:
( ,

)

(𝑑 + 𝑔)

𝑎𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

−𝐶

)

=
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Otherwise, 𝑃(

and 𝑃(

=

)

( ,

)

. Meanwhile, the optimal profit of

=

)

( ,

)

provider is:
𝑑

𝑎𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

+ 𝑔(

𝑎𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,

)

)

+1

+

𝑏𝑋(
𝑋(

,

,
)

)

)−𝐶
+1

Proof of Proposition 5
If pay-per-use is the pricing strategy, 𝑃(

)

> 0, 𝑃(

)

> 0, 𝑃 = 0.

Solve the first derivatives of the optimal price:
𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑋(

,

)

=

𝑎
𝑃(

)

𝑏
𝑃(

𝑎
𝑃(

𝑏
𝑃(

(A1-14)

−1

(A1-15)

−1
)

(A1-16)

−1
)

(A1-17)

−1
)

The optimal profits of provider:
𝑑

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

max
(

), (

)

)

+1

𝑑(𝑃(
)

+

𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

) 𝑋( ,

=

)

)

), (

+1

+ 𝑃(

max
(

)

+ 𝑔(𝑎 −

) 𝑋( ,

𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃(
)

𝑎
𝑋( ,

))

+ 𝑔 𝑃(

)

+ 𝑏 − 𝑃(

)

+1

) 𝑋( ,

)

+𝑏 −

)

+ 𝑃(

𝑏
𝑋( ,

)

) 𝑋( ,

+ 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃(

)

)−𝐶
+1
)

−𝐶

+ 𝑏 − 𝑃(

))
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According to Proposition 1, cloud provider needs to employ an appropriate pricing to
optimize the potential revenues. Let’s consider the following function first,
max 𝑑(𝑃(
(

) 𝑋( ,

)

)) +

𝑔 𝑃(

) 𝑋( ,

= max 𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃(

)

(

)

+ 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃(

))

)

In order to optimize the above function,
𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

≤ 𝑃(

)

≤

𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

Cloud provider is difficult to differentiate different types of customers, they need an
identical pricing strategy to optimize their revenues. Meantime, in order to maximize the utility,
the high-demand customers would like to optimize their demand as 𝑋( ,

),

and the low-demand

customers’ demand will increase because of the decreasing of market price of cloud services.
Hence,
max 𝑑 𝑃(
(

= max 𝑑(𝑃(
(

)

When g𝑋(
otherwise, 𝑃(

)

𝑔 𝑎 − 𝑃(

)

+ 𝑔 𝑃(
)

) 𝑋( ,

= max 𝑔𝑎 + (𝑑𝑋(
(

)

,

)

)

− 𝑔)𝑃(

> d, the optimal price when the demand is minimal is 𝑃(
.

=
( ,

)

If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:
,

,

)

=

)

=

)

,
( ,

)

( ,

)

)

Proposition 6.

𝑎log 𝑋(

)

.
( ,

)

)) +

) 𝑋( ,

> d, the optimal price when the demand is maximal is 𝑃(

=

)

When g𝑋(
otherwise, 𝑃(

,

) 𝑋( ,

)

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋(

,

)

+ 1).

,
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And the optimal profit is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔) alog 𝑋(
( ,

Based on the results, 𝑑

( ,

(𝑑 + 𝑔) alog 𝑋(

,

)

,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋(

)

( ,

+

)

)

( ,

+ 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋(

,

)

)

( ,

+ 𝑔(

)

,

( ,

+ 1) − 𝐶
)

( ,

+

)

( ,

)

)−𝐶 <

)

+ 1) − 𝐶.

Proof of Proposition 6
According to Proposition 2, cloud provider’s asking price to the high-demand customer
is:
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)

Cloud provider’s asking price to the low-demand customer is:
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)

Since cloud provider cannot differentiate different types of customers, in order to
optimize the revenues, the provider has to hold the high-demand customers, not to attract the
low-demand customers. The asking price to both two types of customers should be
𝑎 log 𝑋( ,
Also, 𝑎 <

𝑎 and 𝑏 <

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)

𝑏

Then, the optimize profits of provider is:
(𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( ,
Because 𝑋( ,

)

≥ 0 and 𝑋( ,
𝑑

+𝑏 −

𝑏
𝑋( ,

)

𝑎 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

)

+

)

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶

≥ 0,
𝑏 𝑋( ,
𝑋( ,

)

)

+1

+ 𝑔(𝑎 −

) − 𝐶 < (𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( ,
+1

)

𝑎
𝑋( ,

)

+1

+ 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( ,

)

+ 1)] − 𝐶
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Hence, when g𝑋(

,

)

> d and g𝑋(

,

)

> d, cloud providers will employ subscription as

their cloud pricing strategy, because of the revenues from subscription is greater than that of payper-use. Therefore, cloud providers could obtain more revenues if they adopt with subscription
instead of pay-per-use.
According to the mathematical proof of two categories of customers, homogeneous and
heterogeneous customers, it is clearly indicating that subscription can generate more revenues
than pay-per-use. In practice, mor and more cloud-relevant companies employ subscription
instead of pay-per-use, to potentially reduce the marketing price of cloud resources and make
more profits. Customers would like to seek any less expensive cloud resources of the same QoS
through the pricing strategy of subscription as well. Therefore,

Corollary 1.
Subscription can help cloud service providers obtain more revenues. In other words,
subscription is a better pricing mechanism than pay-per-use.
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A.2 Dynamic Auction Design is Superb to Fixed Pricing Strategy

A.2.1 Monotonicity

Lemma 1: If one customer can win with bidding of 𝐵 , he or she will continue to win for
any (𝐵 > 𝐵 ) bid.
Proof.
For a winning customer (𝑖), his or her bidding density is 𝑑 =

, and expenses is 𝑃 =

× 𝑄 × 𝑂 . 𝑂 are other factors that impacting the value of cloud resources but not considered in
the proposed mechanisms.
The winning customer (𝑖) would involve in more auctions to purchase more cloud services.
According to the payment function, if the customer wants to win again, the customer has two ways
to do that: lifting the bid (𝐵 ) or reducing sum of services (𝑄 ). Such as:
If
𝐵 >𝐵
Then
𝑑

=

>𝑑 =

(A2-1)

If
𝑄 <𝑄 ,
Then
𝑑

=

>𝑑 =

(A2-2)
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Hence, the monotonicity can guarantee the winning customer obtain more cloud resources,
if the customer doesn’t have a limited budget constraint, because more cloud resources need more
affordable investment, even though the customer may have chance to pay by the second highest
price that is less than his or her own bid

A.2.2 A Double Auction is better than Subscription
Proof.
A provider j’s utility (𝑈 ) is,
𝑈 =𝐵 -𝑃

(A2-3)

𝑈 =𝐵 - 𝐵

(A2-4)

A customer i’s utility (𝑈 ) is,

The price of an economic efficiency mechanism (𝑃 ) is
𝑃

=

(A2-5)

The trading price of a double auction (𝑃) is
𝑃=

(A2-6)

Proposition 7.
The utility of an economically efficient auction (𝑈 ) equals to the utility of a fixed price
(𝑈 ).
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Proposition 8.
The utility of a double auction (𝑈 ) is better than that of an economically efficient auction
(𝑈 ).

Corollary 2.
Compared with subscription, a double auction generates more revenues.
For customer i, the utility of a double auction minus the utility of a fixed pricing is:
𝑈–𝑈

(A2-7)

𝑈 =𝐵 -𝐵

(A2-8)

Specifically,

𝑈 =𝑈

= 𝐵 - 𝑃

𝑈–𝑈 =

-𝐵

Based on the Assumption
(𝐵 ≥ 𝐵 )
And,
𝐵 ≥ 𝐵 ，
Thus,
𝑈–𝑈 ≥0
Therefore, Corollary 2 is proved: a double auction generates more revenues than
subscription.

(A2-10)
(A2-11)
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